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Posts Tagged ‘Eleventh Circuit’

As Commerce Moves Online, the Americans with Disabilities Act Follows

Posted on: February 11th, 2019

By: Natalie Pulley

Does the Americans with Disabilities Act, requiring accessibility in public accommodations, apply to a business’ online presence? The Eleventh Circuit has weighed in on the issue, finding in Dennis Haynes v. Dunkin’ Donuts LLC that the ADA applies online.

In Dennis Haynes, the plaintiff is blind and relies on screen reading software. He attempted to go on the website for Dunkin’ Donuts but the website was not compatible with his, or any, screen reading software. The plaintiff sued Dunkin’ Donuts, LLC, claiming that it violated Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act by not maintaining a website compatible with screen reading software. He alleged that the inaccessibility of Dunkin’ Donuts’ website has denied blind people the ability to enjoy the goods, services, privileges, and advantages of Dunkin’ Donuts shops.

The Eleventh Circuit agreed with his position and found that a website must comply with ADA requirements. The court found that a website is a service that facilitates the use of brick and mortar shops, which are places of public accommodation. Further, the court found that the ADA is clear that whatever goods and services the business offers as part of its public accommodation, it cannot discriminate against people on the basis of a disability, even if those goods and services are intangible. This opinion sides with a federal court ruling from Florida, which ruled that a supermarket chain could be liable under the statute for operating an inaccessible site.

While there is no blanket requirement of any specific auxiliary aides on corporate websites, the proliferation of website lawsuits presents a risk of liability. Corporations should take proactive steps to ensure that their websites are accessible to those with hearing, muscular, and visual impairments.

If you have any questions or would like more information, please contact Natalie Pulley at [email protected].

Haynes v. Dunkin’ Donuts, Ltd. Liab. Co., 741 F. App’x 752 (11th Cir. 2018)
Gil v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 3d 1340 (S.D. Fla. 2017)

 

 

 

Can You Even Do That? What Happens When a Judge is Sued and the Defense of Absolute Judicial Immunity is Raised

Posted on: February 6th, 2019

By: Jake Loken

It is a rare sight to see a judge being sued, so what happens when one is? The process is generally the same as any other lawsuit, but one important doctrine can get in the way: absolute judicial immunity.

The doctrine of absolute judicial immunity was recently discussed in McCullough v. Finley, 907 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2018). In McCullough, residents of Alabama sued municipal judges, along with a mayor and two police chiefs. The residents alleged the judges had violated federal anti-peonage statutes, which prohibit forced labor by coercive means, and the law of false imprisonment by “unlawfully depriving them of their liberty for their failure to pay fines.”

In response, the judges asserted absolute judicial immunity, but the district court denied immunity. Normally, only final decisions can be appealed, but when a district court denies the defense of absolute judicial immunity, this denial may be immediately appealed as a “final decision.” The denial is a “final decision” because if the court would allow the defense of immunity to stand, then the case would end, as immunity would prevent the suit from moving forward against the judges.

In reviewing the denial of absolute judicial immunity, the Court worked through a four-factor analysis “to determine whether the nature and functions of the alleged acts [were] judicial.” The Court found that the judges’ acts were judicial as they involved sentencing the residents to jail time, which is a normal judicial function that occurred in court.

The Court also determined the judges did not act in the “‘clear absence of all jurisdiction,’” because “[a] judge acts in ‘clear absence of jurisdiction’ only if he lacked subject matter-jurisdiction.” The Court made it clear that only in “rare circumstance[s]” would immunity not apply.

When a judge is sued, the judge can raise the powerful defense of absolute judicial immunity. So to answer the question found in the title, “can you even do that?”—with “that” being sue a judge—yes, a judge can be sued, but absolute judicial immunity can stop the suit in its tracks.

If you have any questions about this case, absolute judicial immunity, or other types of immunity, please contact Jake Loken at [email protected].

Eleventh Circuit Holds That Debt Collector Did Not Violate FDCPA Even Though It Misstated Name of Creditor In Collection Letter

Posted on: November 19th, 2018

By: Bill Buechner

The Eleventh Circuit very recently affirmed a district court’s ruling that a debt collector did not violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act even though the collection misstated the name of the creditor to whom the consumer owed the debt.

In Lait v. Medical Data Sys., 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 31814 (11th Cir. Nov. 9, 2018) (per curiam), the plaintiff incurred medical expenses provided to him by Enterprise Medical Center. A debt collector sent the plaintiff a letter seeking to collect on the debt. The letter indicated that the debt collector was seeking to collect on the “accounts indicated below.” After two intervening paragraphs, the letter listed “Medical Center Enterprise” next to a service date, the plaintiff’s name, and an outstanding balance of $412. The letter did not expressly refer to Medical Center Enterprise as the plaintiff’s creditor.  Id. at *2.

The plaintiff alleged that the collection letter violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g, which requires that debt collectors provide in writing certain information to a consumer in either the initial communication or within five days thereafter, including the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed. The plaintiff did not contend that the different word order of the hospital in the letter caused him any confusion. Instead, the plaintiff asserted that the letter failed to “meaningfully convey” the name of the creditor to whom he owed the debt.

The Eleventh Circuit assumed, without deciding, that the plaintiff’s claim was governed by the least sophisticated consumer standard. Under this standard, the court presumes that the consumer “possess[es] a rudimentary amount of information about the world and a willingness to read a collection notice with some care.” Id. at *5 (citing cases).  Applying this standard, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that, because the plaintiff acknowledged that he had received medical treatment at a hospital called “Enterprise Medical Center,” the least sophisticated consumer “could be expected to connect the dots on a collection letter that lists the name ‘Medical Center Enterprise’ next to an outstanding balance.” Id. In other words, “[a] consumer who had been a patient at a hospital would surely understand the hospital to be the creditor when its name was listed next to the amount of the debt.” Id. at *5-6. Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit held that the letter complied with § 1692g.

The Eleventh Circuit has applied the least sophisticated consumer standard to other sections of the FDCPA, including 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e and 1692f.  Other circuits, including the Third, Sixth and Ninth Circuit have applied the least sophisticated consumer standard to claims brought pursuant to § 1692g as well. The Eleventh Circuit has suggested in at least one previous unpublished decision that it did not disagree with these other circuit decisions. The panel in Lait, however, suggested that concerns about obscuring information required to be disclosed under § 1692g could be addressed in other sections of the FDCPA. Lait, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 31814, at *4 n.2.

Thus, it remains an open question in the Eleventh Circuit as to whether the least sophisticated consumer standard applies to claims under § 1692g, or whether courts should simply consider whether the collection letter contains the information required by § 1692g without considering whether the least sophisticated consumer would understand it.

If you have any questions or would like more information, please contact Bill Buechner at [email protected].

Eleventh Circuit Again Rejects Claim That Title VII Prohibits Discrimination On The Basis Of Sexual Orientation

Posted on: July 23rd, 2018

By: Bill Buechner

In Bostock v. Clayton Co. Bd of Comm’rs, 723 F. App’x 964 (11th Cir. 2018), the Eleventh Circuit again held that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.   In doing so, the panel relied on prior circuit precedent in Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 138 S.Ct.  557 (2017) and Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1979).    Jack Hancock and Bill Buechner are representing the County in the case.

Last week, the Eleventh Circuit issued an order denying a request from a member of the Court for rehearing en banc.  Bostock v. Clayton Co. Bd. of Commissioners, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 19835,  2018 WL 3455013 (11th Cir. July 18, 2018).   The order was notable because it was accompanied by a dissent by two circuit judges sharply criticizing their colleagues for not agreeing to rehear the case en banc.

The plaintiff in Bostock had already filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court, and the County will be filing a response to that petition in the next few weeks.   The employer in Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc) also has filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court seeking review of the Second Circuit’s ruling that Title VII does prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.

We will report on the outcome of these pending petitions for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court.

If you have any questions or would like more information, please contact Bill Buechner at [email protected].

Little Miller, Big Implications

Posted on: June 20th, 2018

By: Samantha Skolnick

In Georgia, when an individual performs work on a state construction project, they can file a lien for non-payment.  The lien is against the project through Georgia’s Little Miller Act. The claim itself is not against the state or county’s actual property. The claim is against a posted bond, and is a “Bond Claim” or “Little Miller Act Claim.”

In a recent decision by the Eleventh Circuit, the Court affirmed summary judgment for the surety based on Georgia’s one-year statute of limitations for little miller act claims. Strickland v. Arch Ins. Co., No. 17-106102018 WL 327443 (11th Cir. Jan. 9, 2018) (rehearing denied Apr. 4, 2018).

Strickland was tasked with providing sand to a paving company (“Douglas”) for the Georgia Department of Transportation (“GDOT”) as they worked on a road improvement project (the “Project”).  Arch Insurance Company (“Arch”) was the surety who issued payment and performance bonds for Douglas.  In 2007, GDOT declared Douglas in default and they were removed from the Project.  The surety brought in another company to complete the work on the Project. Strickland did not supply any sand after Douglas was removed from the Project.

GDOT determined that the Project was substantially complete in August of 2010 and in September 2010 made its punch list. The new contractor brought on by the surety finished the punch list in September 2011.  In March 2012, GDOT accepted Project maintenance responsibilities and made semi-final payment to Arch in July 2012.

In September 2012, Strickland directed a demand for payment on Arch’s payment bond.  Arch acknowledged the claim but requested additional documentation, which was not provided by Strickland.  In 2014, Strickland filed a lawsuit against Arch. The trial court concluded that there was no dispute that the project was completed and accepted in September 2011.  With that ruling, Georgia’s one-year statute of limitations on payment bond claims barred Strickland’s action and consequently Strickland appealed.

The Appellate Court rejected Strickland’s arguments, holding that “completion” and “acceptance” used in the statute relate to the actual work on the project and are not dependent on the ending of future contractual duties or on the public owner’s internal policies and procedures.

The main takeaway: under Georgia law, the date a public owner states that the project is “completed” or “accepted” does not dictate whether the statute of limitation is running.  Georgia’s one-year statute of limitations under Georgia’s Little Miller Act begins when the actual work is substantially completed. Punch list items do not need to be finished.

If you have any questions, please contact Samantha Skolnick at [email protected].