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Posts Tagged ‘Justice Kennedy’

Supreme Court to Revisit Liability Under Rule 10b-5 – Will Prospective Justice Kavanaugh Weigh In?

Posted on: July 25th, 2018

By: Ted Peters

Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, and Rule 10b-5 promulgated under it, makes certain conduct in connection with the purchase or sale of any security unlawful.  Specifically, Rule 10b-5(a) prohibits the use of any “device, scheme, or artifice to defraud.”  10b-5(b) prohibits the use of any “untrue statement of a material fact” or the omission of any “material fact necessary in order to make the statements… not misleading.”  And 10b-5(c) prohibits “any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.”

In Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011), the United States Supreme Court addressed whether a mutual fund investment adviser could be held liable under Rule 10b-5 for false statements included in its client mutual funds’ prospectuses.  The Court concluded that the adviser could not be held liable under the rule because it did not make the statements in the prospectuses.

In Lorenzo v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 872 F.3d 578 (2017), the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeal considered whether a registered representative of a broker-dealer, who allegedly emailed false and misleading statements prepared by his boss to investors, could be found liable under Rule 10b-5.  Initially, the case was tried before an Administrative Law Judge who concluded that Lorenzo’s boss had drafted the emails in question; Lorenzo did not read the text of the emails; and Lorenzo had “sent the emails without even thinking about the contents.”  The judge also found that the emails were sent “at the request” of Lorenzo’s boss.  Notwithstanding these findings, the judge nevertheless concluded that Lorenzo had willfully violated securities laws (i.e., that Lorenzo had acted with an intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud).  As a sanction, the judge not only fined Lorenzo, but also imposed a lifetime suspension effectively barring him from the securities industry.

Lorenzo appealed the ruling before the Securities Exchange Commission.  The Commission affirmed, concluding that Lorenzo himself was “responsible” for the contents of the emails his boss asked him to send even though it was undisputed that Lorenzo’s boss had prepared the contents of the emails and that Lorenzo had simply “cut and pasted” the contents into the emails at issue.  Notably, the SEC found that Lorenzo’s conduct triggered liability under each of the subparts of Rule 10b-5, including 10b-5(b) which, under Janus, necessarily required an affirmative finding that Lorenzo had actually “made” the statements in question.

Lorenzo next appealed to the D.C. Circuit Court.  On September 29, 2017, a divided court upheld the SEC’s determination.  The court agreed that there was substantial evidence that the statements in Lorenzo’s emails were false or misleading and that Lorenzo possessed the requisite intent to mislead, deceive or defraud. However, the court disagreed with the SEC’s determination that Lorenzo was the “maker” of the statements as required by Rule 10b-5(b).  “We conclude that Lorenzo did not ‘make’ the false statements at issue for purposes of Rule 10b-5(b) because Lorenzo’s boss, and not Lorenzo himself, retained ‘ultimate authority’ over the statements.” [Citing Janus.]  On this basis, the court set aside the sanctions and remanded the case to enable the SEC to reassess appropriate penalties.

Judge Brett Kavanaugh, the current presidential nominee to fill the vacancy left by Justice Kennedy, penned a strongly worded dissent.  Kavanaugh criticized the conclusion reached by his colleagues that the “scheme liability” provisions of Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) may be used to find liability even where the defendant is not the “maker” of the statements (and thus not liable under 10b-5(b)).

On June 18, 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court granted the petition for writ of certiorari.  The question before the Supreme Court is simple: Can a defendant be held liable under the so-called scheme liability provisions of Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) in connection with using false or misleading statements, even if that defendant is not the “maker” of the statements?  That the Court accepted certiorari certainly suggests that the Court desires to further define the scope and limitations of Rule 10b-5.

Should Kavanaugh be confirmed as the next Supreme Court Justice, it remains to be seen whether he will recuse himself on the grounds that he heard the case below.  If he does, then the Court could well end up with a 4-4 split, which would effectively affirm the lower court’s ruling.  The Court’s four more liberal justices (Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor and Kagan) each dissented from Janus.  On the other hand, if Kavanaugh is confirmed and does not recuse himself, the majority of the Court will likely endorse a more restrictive interpretation of scheme liability under Rule 10b-5.

If you have questions or would like more information, please contact Ted Peters at [email protected].

New Potential SCOTUS Justice: Friend or Foe of Qualified Immunity?

Posted on: July 10th, 2018

By: Sara Brochstein

President Trump announced his decision to nominate Judge Brett Kavanaugh to fill the Supreme Court vacancy created by Justice Anthony Kennedy’s retirement.  Should he be confirmed, Judge Kavanaugh could have significant impact on the preservation of qualified immunity, which continues to come under fire of late.   Essentially, the defense of qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Given the current climate with unending allegations of excessive use of force by police, the call for reconsideration of the expansive protection offered by qualified immunity has become widespread.  And whether officers remain entitled to qualified immunity under the current parameters of the doctrine has substantial effect on civil litigation outcomes and potential damage awards.

Such a hot button issue continues to present itself to the Supreme Court.  In fact, just one year ago, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote separately in the Court’s decision in Ziglar v. Abbasi, stating that in an appropriate case, the Court should reconsider its qualified immunity jurisprudence.   It will be interesting to see how the Court evolves in its decisions to uphold officers’ entitlement to qualified immunity, especially given continuing outspoken public perception on the issue.   However, if Judge Kavanaugh’s recent dissent in Wesby et al. v. District of Columbia et al. is any indication of his views of qualified immunity and the position he would take as a Justice, it appears qualified immunity could endure as a strong  defense given that the Supreme Court ultimately sided with the dissent.

If you have any questions or would like more information, please contact Sara Brochstein at [email protected].

Supreme Court Ends Compulsory Union Payments for Government Employees – So What’s Next?

Posted on: July 5th, 2018

By: Brad Adler & Matt Weiss

On Wednesday June 27, the United States Supreme Court reached a landmark 5-4 decision in Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees Council 31 wherein it ruled that the Constitution’s First Amendment prohibits public sector unions from collecting fees from non-union members.   While the scope of the impact of this ruling will be unknown for years, there is no doubt that Janus weakens the ability of public sector unions to raise money.

In Janus, an employee with the Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services sued the American Federation of State County, and Municipal Employees Council 31 (“AFSCME”) to challenge an “agency fee” that he was required to pay to the union under the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act.  The Act provided that, if a majority of employees in a bargaining unit voted to be represented by a union, the union was designated as the exclusive representative of all employees and, even though employees were not obligated to join the union, they were required to pay the agency fee, a percentage of union dues for “chargeable expenditures,” i.e., the portion of union dues attributable to activities germane to the union’s duties as a collective bargaining representative.  The agency fee excluded “nonchargeable expenditures,” which funded the union’s political and ideological projects.  This distinction between chargeable and nonchargeable expenditures was the framework created by the Supreme Court in its 1977 decision Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209.

The Supreme Court elected to use Janus as a vehicle to overturn Abood and hold that the Illinois law that required nonunion public employees to pay an agency fee to a public union constituted a violation of their First Amendment right to free speech, even if the fees only consisted of chargeable expenditures.  The Court assessed the agency fees under an exacting standard, which required a showing that “a compelled subsidy must serve a compelling state interest that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.”  Applying the standard, the Court declined to identify a “compelling state interest” and found that public-sector unions could no longer extract agency fees from nonconsenting employees.

The Court’s ruling in Janus very likely will have a direct effect on 5 million public employees in 22 states, including California, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania, who are no longer required to pay agency fees for a union in which they are not a member.  However, the impact of this decision is less direct in states where agency fees and, in some cases, public sector collective bargaining, are either non-existent or prohibited.  Nonetheless, even in these states, the Supreme Court’s basic holding in Janus, that the government cannot compel its employees to make payments for causes with which they disagree, could be applied in a variety of other contexts such as mandatory contributions to government pension funds.

Whether the Supreme Court will expand on this newly identified First Amendment right of government employees and non-union members remains to be seen, especially in light of Justice Kennedy’s retirement announcement.  The one certainty is that public unions in cities and counties in nearly half the states in the country will no longer be able to require non-union employees to contribute union fees.  And very few doubt that this new legal reality will reduce (in some capacity) the power of public unions by shrinking their financial base of support and by potentially reducing their membership.

But lawmakers in some states already are rallying to pass statutes that will allow unions to limit the services they provide to only those employees that pay union dues.  As a result, it is important for employers to keep informed on any new Janus-induced union laws in states in which they operate.  In fact, in anticipation of an adverse ruling, on April 12, New York passed legislation that relieved unions from representing the interests of non-members in different areas.

The Janus decision is only the latest chapter in a long and unfinished story written about the constitutionality of certain activities of public sector unions.  More to come in the years ahead. . .

If you have any questions or would like more information, please contact Brad Adler at [email protected] or Matt Weiss at [email protected].