CLOSE X
RSS Feed LinkedIn Instagram Twitter Facebook
Search:
FMG Law Blog Line

Posts Tagged ‘New Jersey’

“Sanctuary Cities” Get a Reprieve For Now

Posted on: January 10th, 2019

By: Pamela Everett

As many city, county and state attorneys are aware, in 2017 the US. Department of Justice (DOJ) added three conditions to the application process for the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (“Byrne JAG”) program in an effort to eliminate so called sanctuary cities. The Byrne JAG program originated from the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,  which created grants to assist the law enforcement efforts of state and local authorities. Under the Byrne JAG program, states and localities may apply for funds to support criminal justice programs in a variety of categories, including law enforcement, prosecution, crime prevention, corrections, drug treatment, technology, victim and witness services, and mental health.

The first condition, called the “Notice Condition” requires grantees, upon request, to give advance notice to the Department of Homeland Security of the scheduled release date and time of aliens housed in state or local correctional facilities. The second condition, called the “Access Condition,” requires grantees to give federal agents access to aliens in state or local correctional facilities in order to question them about their immigration status. The third condition, called the “Compliance Condition” requires grantees to certify their compliance with 8 U.S.C. § 1373, which prohibits states and localities from restricting their officials from communicating with immigration authorities regarding anyone’s citizenship or immigration status. Grantees are also required to monitor any subgrantees’ compliance with the three conditions, and to notify DOJ if they become aware of credible evidence of a violation of the Compliance Condition. Additionally, all grantees must certify their compliance with the three conditions, which carries the risk of criminal prosecution, civil penalties, and administrative remedies. The DOJ also requires the jurisdictions’’ legal counsel to certify compliance with the conditions.

A number of jurisdictions have sued the DOJ and the U. S. Attorney General regarding these new conditions and sought a nationwide injunction; however, so far, none have  been successful in obtaining a nationwide injunction.  Recently a partial win was handed to the states of New York, Connecticut, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Washington, and Commonwealths of Massachusetts and Virginia and the City of New York. The States and the City challenged the imposition of the three conditions on five bases: (1) the conditions violates the separation of powers, (2) the conditions were ultra vires under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), (3) the conditions were not in accordance with law under the APA, (4) the conditions were arbitrary and capricious under the APA, and (5) § 1373 violated the Tenth Amendment’s prohibition on commandeering.  This case challenged the authority of the Executive Branch of the federal government to compel states to adopt its preferred immigration policies by imposing conditions on congressionally authorized funding to which the states are otherwise entitled.

While the court held that the plaintiffs did not make a sufficient showing of nationwide impact to demonstrate that a nationwide injunction was necessary to provide relief to them, it did find as follows: (1) The Notice, Access, and Compliance Conditions were ultra vires and not in accordance with law under the APA. (2) 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a)–(b), insofar as it applies to states and localities, is facially unconstitutional under the anticommandeering doctrine of the Tenth Amendment. (3)  The Notice, Access, and Compliance Conditions violated the constitutional separation of powers. (4)The Notice, Access, and Compliance Conditions were arbitrary and capricious under the APA.  (5) The DOJ was mandated to reissue the States’ FY 2017 Byrne JAG award documents without the Notice, Access, or Compliance Conditions, and upon acceptance to disburse those awards as they would in the ordinary course without regard to those conditions.  Additionally, the DOJ was prohibited from imposing or enforcing the Notice, Access, or Compliance Conditions for FY 2017 Byrne JAG funding for the States, the City, or any of their agencies or political subdivisions.

The DOJ was prohibited from imposing or enforcing the Notice, Access, or Compliance Conditions for FY 2017 Byrne JAG funding for the States, the City, or any of their agencies or political subdivisions.

There are several other cases pending, including one filed by the City of San Francisco, seeking the issuance of a nationwide injunction to prohibit the enforcement of the new conditions. Stay tuned for more developments in this area.

If you have any questions or would like more information, please contact Pamela Everett at [email protected].

 

Related litigation: City of Chicago v. Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d 933 (N.D. Ill. 2017); affd. appeal, City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272 (7th Cir. 2018), but later stayed the nationwide scope of the injunction pending en banc review. Conference City of Evanston v. Sessions, No. 18 Civ. 4853, slip op. at 11 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 9, 2018) City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 579 (E.D. Pa. 2017); City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, 309 F. Supp. 3d 289 (E.D. Pa. 2018)(currently on appeal); California ex rel. Becerra v. Sessions, 284 F. Supp. 3d 1015 (N.D. Cal. 2018)

 

Arbitration Agreements in New Jersey Need More Details

Posted on: November 16th, 2018

By: Chris Curci

On November 13, 2018, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, issued an important decision holding that an arbitration agreement between the employer and employee was not enforceable. Flanzman v. Jenny Craig, Inc., Docket No. L-6238-17.  The arbitration agreement read:

Any and all claims or controversies arising out of or relating to [plaintiff’s] employment, the termination thereof, or otherwise arising between [plaintiff] and [defendant] shall, in lieu of a jury or other civil trial, be settled by final and binding arbitration. This agreement to arbitrate includes all claims whether arising in tort or contract and whether arising under statute or common law including, but not limited to, any claim of breach of contract, discrimination or harassment of any kind.

According to the Appellate Division, this agreement was unenforceable because it “failed to identify the general process for selecting an arbitration mechanism.” What exactly does that mean?

In its effort to clarify this standard, the Appellate Division stated that an employer is not required to “detail in the arbitration agreement the exact manner in which the arbitration” will proceed. However, an employer must identify the “forum” for the arbitration and clearly explain how the employee’s judicial rights to a jury trial are being replaced by the arbitration rights.

For example, the Court noted that it would be sufficient for an employer to (1) identify a forum such as the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) or the Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services (“JAMS”), and (2) adopt that forum’s rules and procedures. The Court opined that this would be sufficient because AAA and JAMS’s rules and procedures address numerous procedural issues, such as: (1) notification requirements, (2) how to initiate proceedings, (3) management conferences, (4) discovery, (5) the location of the hearings, (6) the number of arbitrators, (7) how to communicate with the arbitrator, (8) attendance requirements, (9) dispositive motions, (10) evidence, (11) modification of awards, (12) and applications for fees, expenses and costs.

In other words, while the arbitration agreement is not required to “detail the exact manner in which the arbitration will proceed,” an employer must specifically identify a forum such as AAA or JAMS and incorporate that forum’s rules and procedures. This allows the employee to fully understand how his or her judicial rights to a jury trial are being replaced by arbitration.

Employers should review their employee arbitration agreements to ensure their enforceability. If you need help with this or any other employment related question, Chris Curci practices Labor & Employment law in Pennsylvania and New Jersey and is a member of Freeman Mathis & Gary’s Labor and Employment Law National Practice Section. He represents employers in litigation and advises clients on all aspects of employment law. He can be reached at [email protected].

Coffee, Water, Less Than 20 Minutes

Posted on: June 19th, 2018

SCOTUS KICKS THE CAN ON SHORT BREAKS COMPENSATION

By: John McAvoy

On June 11, 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to entertain the appeal of a Pennsylvania employer that could have resolved the emerging split of authority between the federal appellate courts and the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) as to the compensability of employees’ short rest breaks.

In American Future Systems, Inc. d/b/a Progressive Business Publications v. R. Alexander Acosta, Secretary, U.S. Department of Labor, the Secretary of Labor filed suit against Progressive Business Publications, a company that publishes and distributes business publications and sells them through its sales representatives, as well as the company’s owner, alleging they violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) by paying their salespeople an hourly wage and bonuses based on their number of sales per hour while they were logged onto the computer at their workstations, and by not paying them if they were logged off for more than 90 seconds.

The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania previously found that the employer’s policy had violated the FLSA, relying on a DOL regulation which states that “[r]est periods of short duration, running from 5 minutes to about 20 minutes, are common in industry.  They promote the efficiency of the employee and are customarily paid for as working time.  They must be counted as hours worked.”  In so holding, the District Court found that the employer was liable for at least $1.75 million in back wages and damages.

On appeal to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, the employer argued that that it provided “flex time” rather than “breaks,” which allowed workers to clock out whenever they wanted, for any reason.  In other words, that the employees were not “working” after they logged off of their computers since they could do anything they wanted, including leaving the office.  The appellate court rejected this argument, reasoning that to dock the pay of employees who can’t manage a bathroom sprint is “absolutely contrary to the FLSA,” and affirmed the lower court’s decision.

The Third Circuit’s reliance on DOL regulation was contrary to the holdings of some of the other circuit courts which opted to assess the circumstances of the break in lieu of interpreting the DOL regulation as a bright-line rule that fails to take into consideration the facts of a particular situation.

The employer asked the U.S. Supreme Court to clarify how compensability for breaks should be determined.  Citing the circuit split, the employer posited that the question of break pay should be determined by assessing the circumstances of the break, rather than adopting the DOL regulation as a bright-line rule.  In its reply brief, the DOL fervently defended its regulations and denied the existence of the alleged circuit split, arguing that “hours worked [are] not limited to the time an employee actually performs his or her job duties.”  Unfortunately, this remains an issue for another day as the Supreme Court refused to hear the case and/or resolve the alleged split.

Absent a decision from the Supreme Court to the contrary, employers in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Delaware are bound by the Third Circuit’s decision. As such, employers in these states must continue to comply with DOL regulations with respect to the compensability of short breaks.

Fortunately, the applicable DOL regulations are designed to protect employers’ rights. For starters, the regulations recognize that meal periods serve a different purpose than coffee or snack breaks and, as such, are not compensable.  Second, an employer need not count an employee’s unauthorized extensions of authorized work breaks as hours worked when the employer has expressly and unambiguously communicated to the employee that the authorized break may only last for a specific length of time, that any extension of the break is contrary to the employer’s rules, and any extension of the break will be punished.

Although an employer will have to compensate an employee who repeatedly takes unauthorized breaks lasting less than 20 minutes in order to comply with the Third Circuit’s ruling and the applicable DOL regulations, the employer is nevertheless free to discipline the employee for such indiscretions by whatever means the employer deems appropriate, including termination.

Prudent employers should prepare themselves to address such issues through smart planning and proper training of employees, including managers, supervisors and HR personnel to ensure the employer’s break, discipline, and termination policies and procedures comply with all applicable DOL regulations.

Want to know whether your company’s break, discipline, and termination policies and procedures comply with DOL regulations? Let me help. Please call or email me (215.789.4919; [email protected]).

Guns in Workplace: Primer for Employers in PA & NJ

Posted on: April 12th, 2018

By: John P. McAvoy

Presently and tentatively, Pennsylvania and New Jersey do not have guns-at-work laws. There are, however, gun laws in place in both states that similarly impede an employer’s ability to control the workplace; namely, the states’ right-to-carry laws.

New Jersey has some of the most restrictive right-to-carry laws in the country. For starters, the state does not allow individuals to open carry handguns. The state is also known as a “may issue” state, which means the chief police officer of a city or county, or the superintendent of the state police, has discretion in determining whether to issue a concealed weapons permit to an applicant. New Jersey law generally forbids any person to “ha[ve] in his possession any handgun …, without first obtaining a permit to carry the same.” N.J.S.A. § 2C:39-5(b). While state law provides certain exceptions to this general ban—including one for “keeping or carrying [a firearm] about [one’s] place of business, residence, premises or other land owned or possessed by him,” id. at § 2C:39-6(e), these exceptions do not allow the concealed carrying of a handgun in public without first obtaining a permit, and it is nearly impossible for an individual to obtain a handgun carry permit in New Jersey. See generally id. at §§ 2C: 58-3; 58-4; and N.J.A.C. 13:54-2.4(b) (outlining numerous screening and training requirements an applicant must satisfy in order to be eligible for a handgun carry permit, including a ‘justifiable need’ to carry a handgun). New Jersey’s right-to-carry laws are so restrictive that the state does not have or need separate laws governing firearms on private property, including parking lots, much less in the workplace. On their face, these laws make it unlawful for almost all employees to possess concealed firearms in the workplace.

Pennsylvania’s right-to-carry laws are far less exacting than their New Jersey counterparts. Unlike New Jersey, Pennsylvania law is silent on the legality of openly carrying a firearm, making it de facto to do so in all places except Philadelphia. It is also a “shall issue” state. This means that while a person needs to obtain a license to carry a handgun, the granting authority (i.e., the sheriff or police chief) has no discretion to deny an applicant provided he or she meets the necessary character and fitness requirements. See 18 Pa. C.S. § 6109. Unlike New Jersey, there is no requirement that an applicant demonstrate “good cause” for the weapon. Instead, law enforcement has 45 days to investigate an applicant’s background to determine eligibility. See id. Moreover, and with the limited exception of commonsense places designated by statute as off-limits, including schools, correctional facilities, and courts, id. at §§ 912-913, 5122; 50 P.S. § 4605; et al., any employee with a license to carry may come to work with a gun concealed on his or her person.

While Pennsylvania’s right-to-carry laws are relatively liberal, there are no state laws that force an employer or business to allow or prohibit guns on its property. While 20 states have laws that regulate whether employees have the right to transport and store licensed, concealed weapons in their locked vehicles in an employer’s parking lot, the majority of states – including Pennsylvania – do not.  Without an express statute on point, courts generally give employers the right to control the workplace. As such, employers are free to impose policies allowing or restricting the possession of weapons in vehicles parked on company property and/or in the workplace.

In 2015, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania addressed an employer’s efforts to control the workplace by enforcing its weapons restrictions policy. In Stewart v. FedEx Express, 114 A.3d 424 (Pa. Super. 2015), the Superior Court upheld the right of FedEx to terminate the plaintiff for carrying a handgun in the glove compartment of his personal vehicle while performing work for FedEx. Id. at 424. FedEx’s policy prohibits employees from having firearms or weapons on company property, in company vehicles or in company buildings, unless authorized by FedEx security. Id. at 426. In so holding, the Superior Court noted that Pennsylvania is an at-will state and rejected the plaintiff’s constitutional claim that he had an unrestricted “right to bear arms,” even at work, and reasoned that “neither the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution, nor the Pennsylvania Constitution, bestows on any person the right to carry a concealed firearm or transport a loaded firearm in a vehicle.” Id. at 428-29. Moreover, the Court noted that Pennsylvania has no right-to-carry law that restricts employers from prohibiting firearms on their property or while performing work duties. Id. at 429.

Pennsylvania and New Jersey are ‘employment at-will’ states; meaning, employers may generally terminate an employment relationship at any time and for any reason. Therefore, employers in both states are free to terminate an employee for any reason regardless of whether there is a specific policy on point. Nevertheless, it is a good idea for employers in Pennsylvania and New Jersey to follow FedEx’s example and take similar steps to control the workplace.

Pennsylvania employers in favor of guns in the workplace may impose policies relative to same. These policies should detail the type of weapons permitted in the workplace and in vehicles parked on company property, and state that the company policy is subject to the licensing requirements of state law. These policies should also set forth the employer’s expectations with respect to the handling and storage of weapons on company property and in the workplace. To limit any potential confusion with respect to the company’s expectations and what is and is not permissible, it is recommended that employers make their policies as detailed as possible.

New Jersey’s right-to-carry laws are so restrictive that is almost always unlawful for an employee to possess a firearm in the workplace. As such, most New Jersey employers cannot authorize their employees to possess a firearm in the workplace without violating state law. However, to avoid any ambiguity and as an added layer of protection from liability, New Jersey employers may also adopt policies to better control the workplace.

It is important for Pennsylvania employers opposed to the idea of guns and other weapons in the workplace take steps to further their interests. To that end, Pennsylvania employers may implement policies that prohibit employees from having firearms or weapons on company property, in company vehicles or in company buildings. Absent such policies, there is nothing prohibiting a properly licensed Pennsylvania employee from bringing his or her concealed gun to the workplace.

It is recommended that the policies adopted and implemented by employers opposed to guns and weapons in the workplace in both states clearly explain that all employees, including those with licenses to carry, are forbidden from having firearms or weapons on company property, in company vehicles, or in company buildings, unless expressly authorized by the employer. It is also a good idea for these policies to provide that violation of the company’s weapons policies is grounds for immediate termination, as it would make the process of terminating an employee for-cause much cleaner and could allow the employer to save on future litigation and unemployment benefits costs associated with the termination. This is because employees that are terminated for-cause are generally ineligible to receive unemployment benefits and will have a harder time asserting a meritorious wrongful termination lawsuit against their former employers.

Given this is a rapidly changing and developing area of the law, it is also suggested that employers charge someone in their human resources and/or compliance departments with staying current on the gun control regulations. Absent immunity, complying with a law that allows employees to bring concealed firearms to the employer’s property can increase legal risk. In contrast, noncompliance with a gun law can lead to civil liability or criminal penalties in some states. Therefore, it is important that employers stay apprised of the rapidly changing gun laws of each state in which they conduct business. The person charged with this responsibility should understand the impact the new gun control law might have on the business and recognize what, if any, changes in the law require an amendment to company policies.

If you have any questions or would like more information, please contact John McAvoy at [email protected].