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Archive for January, 2019

New Task Force Aims to Reform California’s Technological Ethical Rules

Posted on: January 15th, 2019

By: Paige Pembrook

On December 5, 2018, the California State Bar Task Force on Access Through Innovation in Legal Services held its first meeting and started a long process to modernize ethical rules that currently inhibit lawyers from fully using innovative technologies and services from non-lawyer businesses. Under the Current Rules of Professional Conduct for California lawyers, attorneys risk professional discipline and malpractice liability when using services and software offered by non-lawyer technology businesses, even though those services and software offer significant potential to improve access to and delivery of legal services.

Earlier this year, the State Bar charged the Task Force with recommending rule modifications to allow collaboration and technological innovation in legal services, including use of artificial intelligence and online legal service delivery models. The Task Force is specifically tasked with scrutinizing existing rules and regulations concerning the unauthorized practice of law, lawyer advertising and solicitation, partnerships with non-lawyers, fee splitting, and referral compensation. The Task Force must submit its recommendations to the State Bar Board of Trustees before December 31, 2019.

As any effective rule changes remain years away, lawyers must be aware of and comply with the current rules that restrict lawyers seeking to collaborate with and use technology from non-lawyer businesses. The Rules of Professional Conduct are often implicated when lawyers collaborate with non-lawyer businesses offering technology-driven legal services and software. These rules include those premised on harm to clients that flows from incompetent legal service (Rule 1.1), non-lawyer ownership of law offices and the unauthorized practice of law (Rules 5.4 and 5.5), and the dissemination of biased and/or misleading information (Rules 7.1-7.3).

To the extent that lawyers violate any of the aforementioned rules by using technology-driven legal services and software offered by non-lawyer businesses, they may be subject to State Bar discipline.

If you have any questions or would like more information, please contact Paige Pembrook at [email protected].

Insurer Side Beware: Litigation Privilege for Pre-Suit Communications Extends Only To The Party Contemplating Filing Of Litigation

Posted on: January 14th, 2019

By: Tim Kenna & Kristin Ingulsrud

Strawn v. Morris, Polich & Purdy—filed Jan. 4, 2019, Court of Appeal of California, First District, Division Two 2019 Cal.App. LEXIS 9*—makes explicit that the application of the litigation privilege to pre-suit claims communications where the policyholder disputes its contemplation of litigation only applies to policy side interests if the insurer is contemplating litigation in good faith.

The litigation privilege makes inadmissible any communication made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings. California Civil Code § 47(b)(2). This privilege extends to pre-litigation statements relating to litigation contemplated in good faith and under serious consideration. Action Apartment Assn., Inc v. City of Santa Monica (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1232, 1251.

In Strawn, the insureds brought a cause of action for invasion of privacy against State Farm’s counsel based on the alleged wrongful transmittal of the insureds’ tax returns to State Farm in connection with a coverage investigation involving potential arson. The MPP argued that the transmittal was protected by the litigation privilege because it was in anticipation of the civil action the insureds “would surely and did in fact” file. The trial court agreed and sustained the demurrer based on the litigation privilege.

The California Court of Appeal reversed. In order for the insurer to apply the privilege to its own communications, the Court held, the insurer would need to establish that it was contemplating litigation in good faith when it received the tax returns.

There have been cases in which the courts have held that routine claims communications relate to the business of insurance and are not protected speech. See, e.g. People ex. Rel. Fire Insurance Exchange v. Anapol (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 809. Other cases have attempted to discern whether the communications themselves establish a good faith consideration of litigation. Blanchard v. DIRECTV, Inc. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 903.  Strawn seems to go one step further in requiring the movant to establish that IT was contemplating the filing of litigation in good faith. Strawn appears to hold that at least in a case of disputed intent of the policyholder, the insurer side’s good faith subjective or objectively reasonable belief that the policyholder was contemplating litigation is irrelevant. Thus, where claimants’ counsel threatens suit, there was no protection to the insurer side no matter how unlikely settlement.

Strawn’s effects may be felt by litigants who attempt to utilize the litigation privilege in furtherance of dispositive pre-trial motions, including anti-SLAPP and motions for summary judgment.  First, Strawn emphasizes that good faith is a question of fact that must be determined before the litigation privilege can apply. Second, it severely limits the application of the litigation privilege in favor of any party who is responding to a perceived threat of litigation, even if that perceived threat is objectively reasonable.

If you have any questions or would like more information, please contact Tim Kenna at [email protected] or Kristin Ingulsrud at [email protected].

“Sanctuary Cities” Get a Reprieve For Now

Posted on: January 10th, 2019

By: Pamela Everett

As many city, county and state attorneys are aware, in 2017 the US. Department of Justice (DOJ) added three conditions to the application process for the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (“Byrne JAG”) program in an effort to eliminate so called sanctuary cities. The Byrne JAG program originated from the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,  which created grants to assist the law enforcement efforts of state and local authorities. Under the Byrne JAG program, states and localities may apply for funds to support criminal justice programs in a variety of categories, including law enforcement, prosecution, crime prevention, corrections, drug treatment, technology, victim and witness services, and mental health.

The first condition, called the “Notice Condition” requires grantees, upon request, to give advance notice to the Department of Homeland Security of the scheduled release date and time of aliens housed in state or local correctional facilities. The second condition, called the “Access Condition,” requires grantees to give federal agents access to aliens in state or local correctional facilities in order to question them about their immigration status. The third condition, called the “Compliance Condition” requires grantees to certify their compliance with 8 U.S.C. § 1373, which prohibits states and localities from restricting their officials from communicating with immigration authorities regarding anyone’s citizenship or immigration status. Grantees are also required to monitor any subgrantees’ compliance with the three conditions, and to notify DOJ if they become aware of credible evidence of a violation of the Compliance Condition. Additionally, all grantees must certify their compliance with the three conditions, which carries the risk of criminal prosecution, civil penalties, and administrative remedies. The DOJ also requires the jurisdictions’’ legal counsel to certify compliance with the conditions.

A number of jurisdictions have sued the DOJ and the U. S. Attorney General regarding these new conditions and sought a nationwide injunction; however, so far, none have  been successful in obtaining a nationwide injunction.  Recently a partial win was handed to the states of New York, Connecticut, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Washington, and Commonwealths of Massachusetts and Virginia and the City of New York. The States and the City challenged the imposition of the three conditions on five bases: (1) the conditions violates the separation of powers, (2) the conditions were ultra vires under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), (3) the conditions were not in accordance with law under the APA, (4) the conditions were arbitrary and capricious under the APA, and (5) § 1373 violated the Tenth Amendment’s prohibition on commandeering.  This case challenged the authority of the Executive Branch of the federal government to compel states to adopt its preferred immigration policies by imposing conditions on congressionally authorized funding to which the states are otherwise entitled.

While the court held that the plaintiffs did not make a sufficient showing of nationwide impact to demonstrate that a nationwide injunction was necessary to provide relief to them, it did find as follows: (1) The Notice, Access, and Compliance Conditions were ultra vires and not in accordance with law under the APA. (2) 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a)–(b), insofar as it applies to states and localities, is facially unconstitutional under the anticommandeering doctrine of the Tenth Amendment. (3)  The Notice, Access, and Compliance Conditions violated the constitutional separation of powers. (4)The Notice, Access, and Compliance Conditions were arbitrary and capricious under the APA.  (5) The DOJ was mandated to reissue the States’ FY 2017 Byrne JAG award documents without the Notice, Access, or Compliance Conditions, and upon acceptance to disburse those awards as they would in the ordinary course without regard to those conditions.  Additionally, the DOJ was prohibited from imposing or enforcing the Notice, Access, or Compliance Conditions for FY 2017 Byrne JAG funding for the States, the City, or any of their agencies or political subdivisions.

The DOJ was prohibited from imposing or enforcing the Notice, Access, or Compliance Conditions for FY 2017 Byrne JAG funding for the States, the City, or any of their agencies or political subdivisions.

There are several other cases pending, including one filed by the City of San Francisco, seeking the issuance of a nationwide injunction to prohibit the enforcement of the new conditions. Stay tuned for more developments in this area.

If you have any questions or would like more information, please contact Pamela Everett at [email protected].

 

Related litigation: City of Chicago v. Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d 933 (N.D. Ill. 2017); affd. appeal, City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272 (7th Cir. 2018), but later stayed the nationwide scope of the injunction pending en banc review. Conference City of Evanston v. Sessions, No. 18 Civ. 4853, slip op. at 11 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 9, 2018) City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 579 (E.D. Pa. 2017); City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, 309 F. Supp. 3d 289 (E.D. Pa. 2018)(currently on appeal); California ex rel. Becerra v. Sessions, 284 F. Supp. 3d 1015 (N.D. Cal. 2018)

 

Philadelphia Burdens New Fair Workweek Law to Impact 130,000 Workers & Employers

Posted on: January 9th, 2019

By:  John McAvoy

On December 7, 2018, the Philadelphia City Council passed the Fair Workweek Employment Standards Ordinance by an overwhelming margin of 14-3. Effective January 1, 2020, the objective of the Ordinance, which was introduced in June by Councilwoman Helen Gym (D), is to provide more predictable hours, advanced scheduling, among a slew of other protections for the roughly 130,000 workers in the food, service, and hospitality industries. The Ordinance’s seven co-sponsors hope the new restrictions will help break the cycle of poverty plaguing the nation’s fifth largest city.

To that laudable yet impracticable end, the Fair Workweek Ordinance imposes significant restrictions and standards on large service industry employers with respect to how they schedule, hire, and pay their workers. It also provides for a private right of action against employers that permits recovery of back pay, presumed damages, liquidated damages up to $2,000, attorneys’ fees and equitable relief.

After much debate with local businesses, the new Ordinance as enacted covers only those “retail establishments,” “hospitality establishments,” and “food services establishments” that employ 250 or more employees overall and have 30 or more locations worldwide, including chains and franchise locations.

New York, San Francisco and other large municipalities through the country have been implementing similar “fair workweek” laws since 2014. Philadelphia is the second largest city to adopt the practice. Like similar legislation enacted across the country, Philadelphia Fair Workweek Ordinance imposes four main requirements on employers:

  1. Schedules in Advance. Employers must provide new hires with a written, good faith estimate of the employee’s work schedule. That schedule can change, but the initial estimate must include: the hours the employee can expect to work over a typical 90-day period; whether the employee can expect to work any on-call shifts; and “a subset of days and a subset of times or shifts that the employee can typically expect to work, or days of the week and times or shifts on which the employee will not be scheduled to work.” The employee can request a different work schedule, but the employer is free to grant or deny the request for any reason that is not unlawful. Employers will also have to consider employee work schedule requests, including requests not to be scheduled for certain shifts, days, times or locations as well as requests for changes in hours worked. Additionally, employers must provide employees with a written work schedule at least 10 days before the first day of a scheduled period (14-days effective January 1, 2021). Employees must receive notice of any proposed changes to the posted work schedule as promptly as possible and prior to the change taking effect, and they have the right to decline to work any hours not reflected on the posted work schedule.

 

  1. Predictability Pay. The Ordinance requires employers to compensate employees for changes to the work schedule. This is commonly referred to as “predictability pay.” The amount of the mandated compensation is to be determined. There are, however, exceptions to this requirement. For example, if the employee initiates the schedule change, or there’s a mutual agreement between the employer and employee, an emergency, or for one of the other less common reasons outlined in the Ordinance, then employers are under no obligation to provide predictability pay.

 

  1. Rest Between Shifts. An employee may decline, without penalty, any work hours that are scheduled or otherwise occur less than 9 hours after his or her prior shift ends. However, if the employee works that second shift, the company must pay that employee $40.

 

  1. Offer Work to Existing Employees. Employees must offer extra shifts to current employees before hiring a new employee. However, if existing employees turn down the offer of extra shifts or if extra shifts would implicate overtime pay, then employers are free to hire new employees.

Employers who violate these requirements subject their business to potential liability. The Free Workweek Ordinance makes it unlawful to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of protected rights under the ordinance. Retaliation is also prohibited, with a rebuttable presumption of retaliation for any adverse action within 90-days of an employee exercising protected rights, unless the adverse action was due to well-documented disciplinary reasons that constitute just cause. The Office of the Mayor of Philadelphia is charged with enforcing the new Ordinance, raising questions as to enforcement policy and litigation.

Prudent employers should start preparing their businesses now, Even though the new requirements and standards imposed by the Ordinance do not take effect for another year. Complicating matters further is the fact that the Ordinance, as a whole, is rather vague and ambiguous in terms of the restrictions it imposes and the ways in which those restrictions will be enforced. Although the legislature should eventually issue regulations to resolve some of the uncertainty, it is unclear when that will occur or if it will happen before the Ordinance takes effect next January. As a result, employers are left fending for themselves to make sweeping changes to their scheduling, hiring, and payment policies, practices, and procedures towards complying with the Ordinance.

The uncertainty and other difficulties employers will likely experience navigating the exacting requirements of Philadelphia’s Fair Workweek Ordinance is nothing new. Employment law is rapidly changing and evolving in Philadelphia at an unparalleled pace. The Fair Workweek Ordinance joins the ranks of similarly taxing legislation such as Philadelphia’s Salary History Ban Law and its Ban-the-Box Law, to name but two of the many legislative minefields presently impacting local employers.

Given this is a rapidly changing and developing area of the law, employers are encouraged to charge someone in their human resources and/or compliance departments with staying current on Philadelphia’s new employment ordinances and regulations. Noncompliance with an applicable regulation or ordinance, no matter how vague it may be written, can lead to civil liability and ignorance of the law is no defense. Therefore, it is important that employers stay apprised of the rapidly changing employment laws. The person charged with this responsibility should understand the impact a new or proposed law might have on the business and recognize what, if any, changes in the law require an amendment to company policies. It is also suggested that employers consult with experienced legal counsel to ensure that their policies and procedures are fully complaint with new legislation.

Need help understanding/navigating Philadelphia’s new legislation or want to learn more about what Philadelphia’s Fair Workweek Ordinance means for your local business? Let Freeman Mathis & Gary’s employment experts help. Feel free to call or email John McAvoy (215.789.4919 [email protected]) for assistance with your company’s policies and procedures.

The Effects of the California Wildfires Continue

Posted on: January 7th, 2019

By: Matthew Jones

The California Insurance Commissioner recently issued a press release regarding the extensive insured losses from the numerous California wildfires. Those losses total over $9 billion, and are even expected to rise. The losses span across various lines of insurance coverage, including commercial, residential, personal and commercial vehicles, and agricultural, to name a few. In light of the substantial losses and long process toward recovery, the Commissioner issued a notice to all insurers asking them to expedite claims and issuing checks immediately for four months of out-of-pocket costs. This notice also requested that the insurers help out the policyholders as much as possible in being lenient regarding document production, which will likely be difficult for policyholders given the damages sustained. The Commissioner also issued a “declaration of emergency” to allow insurers to obtain help from out-of-state claims adjusters in order to deal with the high volume of claims. However, these out-of-state adjusters must be educated and versed in California consumer protection laws, which are much more stringent than other states.

So in a time of heartbreak and sorrow, the Commissioner is coming to the rescue to help ease the insurance claim process and help the thousands of victims get back on their feet. However, despite these efforts, extensive litigation is likely to come from these tragic events as homeowners try to make themselves whole again.

If you have any questions or would like more information, please contact Matthew Jones at [email protected].