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Posts Tagged ‘accident’

Loss of Earnings Calculations – Experts – Damages – California

Posted on: December 16th, 2019

By: Chuck Horn

California just changed the law on recovery of loss of earnings.  Traditionally counsel, and experts, would look to the actual earnings history of the plaintiff, or plaintiff’s decedent, in the years before the accident or injury.  Subpoenas and Requests for Production of Documents would seek the personnel file, the W-2s, the date of initial employment and pay rate, and the person’s wage-increase progress, promotions, and likely future promotions and pay raises, and information to calculate life expectancy.  Then independent forensic economists would be given this information and would investigate the known statistics that apply to that person and calculate reasonably likely “past” earnings from the accident to trial, and reasonably likely “future” loss of earnings.  Seems simple, right?

California has just changed the way all this works.  The California legislature changed the law (Civil Code §3361, enacted by SB 41 in 2019) for civil damages for loss of earnings because the results of past practices “are a reflection of gender pay gaps and workforce discrimination,”  and “perpetuate systemic inequalities” and “disproportionately injure women and minority individuals by depriving them of fair compensation,” recognizing that “[a]ny generalized reduction of civil damages using statistical tables alone, based on a plaintiff’s membership in a protected class identified in Section 51 of the Civil Code, is counter to the public policy of the State of California.”

Effective 01/01/2020 Section 3361 has been added to the California Civil Code, as follows: “Estimations, measures, or calculations of past, present, or future damages for lost earnings or impaired earning capacity resulting from personal injury or wrongful death shall not be reduced based on race, ethnicity, or gender.”  This is a significant change to past practices of counsel and experts for all sides in civil litigation in California and must be taken into account in claim evaluation and trial preparation.

If you have any questions or would like more information, please contact Chuck Horn at [email protected].

Serving That Whiskey Might Be Risky – Liability Of Social Hosts In DUI Accidents

Posted on: February 15th, 2019

By: Stacey Bavafa

Under California Civil Code Section 1714, social hosts and other third parties may be held to be partially liable in the event of a drunk driving accident depending on the circumstances that led up to the accident. Under Sec. 1714, everyone is responsible for the result of his or her willful acts, but also for injuries sustained by another by a want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person.

California courts have held that the furnishing of alcoholic beverages is not the proximate cause of injuries resulting from intoxication, but rather that the consumption of alcoholic beverages is the proximate cause of injuries inflicted upon another by an intoxicated person. Vesley v. Sager (1971) 6 Cal.3d 153; Bernhard v. Harrah’s Club (1976) 16 Cal.3d 313; and Coulter v. Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 144.

Therefore, social hosts who provide alcoholic beverages to a person may not be held legally accountable for damages suffered by the intoxicated person, or for damages the intoxicated person inflicts on another person resulting from the consumption of alcoholic beverages. In other words, if John Doe had 5 glasses of whiskey at a bar and ends up swerving in and out of his lane due to his inebriated state, and hits another vehicle causing injury to a third person, the bar who provided John Doe the 5 glasses of whiskey will not be required to pay for damages sustained by the third party.

There are however, two exceptions to the rule outlined above:

If an adult, including a parent or guardian, who knowingly serves alcoholic beverages at his or her residence to a person whom he or she knows, or should have known, to be under 21 years of age, the adult may be held liable for actions the minor takes as a result of the consumption of alcohol.

Further, if a business sells alcohol to an obviously intoxicated minor, in such that a reasonable person would be able to tell the minor was intoxicated, the business may face liability for harm arising out of the minor’s actions.

In the case of the underaged drinker, both the underaged drinker and the person who was harmed by the actions of the underaged drinker can file a civil claim against the social host or business to obtain recovery of his or her medical bills, property damage, pain and suffering, loss of income, and legal fees.

If you have any questions or would like more information, please contact Stacey Bavafa at (213) 615-7026 or [email protected].

A Holly(cal) Jolly (Almost) Christmas

Posted on: December 28th, 2018

By: Zach Moura

In what is sure to be the beginning of a slew of cases litigating coverage for injuries caused by drones, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California recently issued an opinion denying coverage under an aircraft exclusion in the drone operator’s Commercial General Liability (CGL) policy. Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company v. Hollycal Production, Inc., et al., 5:18-cv-00768.

The accident at issue occurred when Hollycal Production (“Hollycal”) used a drone to photograph an event. The drone collided with one of the attendees, Darshan Kamboj, blinding her in one eye. Ms. Kamboj subsequently filed suit against Hollycal, its owner, and the Hollycal employee that operated the drone. Hollycal tendered the defense of the suit to Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company (“Philadelphia”) under the CGL policy on which Hollycal was an additional insured. Philadelphia agreed to defend Hollycal under a reservation of rights, and then filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a determination that it had no duty to defend or indemnify Hollycal for the Kamboj suit.

Philadelphia moved for summary judgment, in part on the basis that the Aircraft exclusion in the Policy excluded coverage in pertinent part for bodily injury or property damage “arising out of the ownership, maintenance, use or entrustment to others of any aircraft, ‘auto’ or watercraft owned or operated by or rented or loaned to any insured.” Because “aircraft” was not a defined term in the policy, the Court looked to the Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary definition of the word, along with the definition included in 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(6) and 14 C.F.R. § 1.1. The Court concluded that a “drone … is an aircraft under the term’s ordinary and plain definition.” Accordingly, the Court found that the Kamboj suit was excluded from coverage and Philadelphia had no duty to defend or indemnify Hollycal.

Drone operators will need to carefully review their insurance and ensure that they have appropriate coverage in place for their drone operations. As this matter makes clear, and as reinforced by recent reports of a drone striking the nose of an Aeromexico plane, an October near-miss of a drone by a passenger plane near London Heathrow, and the shutdown of London Gatwick airport last week because of suspected drone activity, there is substantial exposure arising from drone operations. Without the right insurance, operators may be left disastrously exposed.

If you have any questions or would like more information, please contact Zach Moura at [email protected].

Is Georgia Game for Growing Bad Faith Liability?

Posted on: July 17th, 2018

By: Jessica Samford

As discussed in my last blog on bad faith, seeking bifurcation can be a proactive means to distinguish the issue of coverage from the issue of bad faith and appropriately manage the all too often unwieldy discovery process before it’s too late.  A recent case in Georgia is an interesting illustration of an insurer’s attempt to bifurcate issues after the discovery stage in a bad faith failure to settle claim in particular and is yet another cautionary example for insurers to carefully consider the increasing potential for extracontractual liability in Georgia.  Whiteside v. GEICO Indem. Co., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87868, *3-*4 (M.D. Ga. May 25, 2018).

In that case, the trial court declined to bifurcate the issues of liability and proximate cause of damages at the trial stage as requested by Geico, which sought to have a jury determine whether or not Geico could be held liable for bad faith failure to settle before being presented with evidence of the default judgment entered against Geico’s insured of almost $3 million and causation of same.  Separation of liability and damages issues was not warranted according to the trial court because facts relating to Geico’s claim handling were relevant to both, and Geico’s concerns could be handled through proper jury instructions, special interrogatories, and the verdict form.  See also Whiteside v. GEICO Indem. Co., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52761 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 29, 2018).  The trial court did, however, bifurcate the claim for punitive damages from the rest of the jury trial.

The result was a jury verdict of $2 million against Geico for failing to settle in response to a bicyclist’s demand for the $30,000 policy limit based on medical bills of almost $10,000 following a motor vehicle accident.  Previously, Geico had argued there was no coverage due to the insured’s failure to notify Geico of the subsequent lawsuit she was served.  Whiteside v. GEICO Indem. Co., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 203617, *6, 2017 WL 6347174 (M.D. Ga. Dec. 12, 2017).  Notwithstanding such a flagrant breach of the policy’s notice conditions, the trial court did not see coverage as being an issue since that coverage defense did not exist at the time Geico responded to the demand by offering to settle for about half the limits instead.

These unusual circumstances are certainly noteworthy, and extracontractual damages such as these are becoming less uncommon in Georgia bad faith cases.  FMG’s Insurance Coverage and Bad Faith BlogLine has already geared up to cover the Georgia Supreme Court’s upcoming rulings after granting cert on the scope of what triggers failure to settle liability in Georgia, not to mention the proposed changes to the Restatement of the Law of Liability Insurance and their impact.  Whatever is in the cards for extracontractual liability in Georgia, the risks presented by settlement demands should be evaluated in light of these current trends.

If you have any questions or would like more information, please contact Jessica Samford at [email protected].

Beware The Egg Shell Plaintiff

Posted on: February 13th, 2018

By: Jared K. Hodges

Recently, a jury from a historically conservative venue in Georgia awarded $2.7 million to a man who claims he was injured in a 4 m.p.h. rear-end collision. This unusual verdict should serve as an expensive reminder to insurance carriers, adjusters, and their counsel that not all low-speed, minor property damage incidents are alike.

Plaintiff Art Smith was 31 years-old when he was rear-ended in his Toyota Camry by John Bishop, who was driving a Ford F-150 pickup truck. Both Smith and Bishop were stopped at a traffic light in Cobb County, Georgia, when Bishop testified he “rolled into” Smith. Smith’s vehicle incurred merely $1,400 worth of damage, and he told the responding officers he was OK, before leaving the scene of the accident on his own.

The next day, however, Smith began experiencing stiffness in his neck, and he went to the emergency room. Smith underwent physical therapy and an MRI scan that revealed herniated discs in his neck, before he ultimately received cervical fusion surgery.

While Smith’s rapid spinal deterioration and treatment seems excessive given his young age, what Bishop could not have known, was Smith had undergone prior treatments for neck injuries several years before the accident. In Georgia, as in many jurisdictions, it is a tenant in torts that “a tortfeasor takes a plaintiff in whatever condition he finds him. A negligent actor must bear the risk that his liability will be increased by reason of the actual physical condition of the other toward whom his act [is] negligent.” AT Sys. Se., Inc. v. Carnes, 272 Ga. App. 671, 674, 613 S.E.2d 150 (2005). As the Smith case shows, the egg shell plaintiff is alive and well.

So many claimants and plaintiffs contend they are “egg shell plaintiffs,” it is easy for adjusters and defense counsel to become immune to these allegations, especially when there is minimal property damage, as there was in this case. Yet, insurers, adjusters, and defense counsel should remember that a tortfeasor takes a plaintiff in the condition where he finds him. If, for example, a plaintiff has a history of neck injuries that makes his neck susceptible to injury, it is possible a jury could find the defendant responsible for all subsequent neck treatments, even from an apparently minor injury-causing incident.

If you have any questions or would like more information, please contact Jared K. Hodges at [email protected]