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Posts Tagged ‘D&O’

Federal Securities Laws: Has the 9th Circuit Gone Rogue Again?

Posted on: February 4th, 2019

By: John Goselin

On January 4, 2019, the United States Supreme Court decided to hear an appeal from the Ninth Circuit’s April 20, 2018 decision in Varjabedian v. Emulex Corporation, 888 F.3d 399 (9th Cir. 2018). The Supreme Court is hearing this case to resolve a circuit split regarding whether a claim under Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires the plaintiff to plead a strong inference that the defendants acted with scienter (i.e. intent to defraud) or whether Section 14(e) merely requires an allegation that the defendants were negligent. Section 14(e) is a provision of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 that prohibits a company involved in a tender offer from making a material misstatement or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading or to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative acts or practices in connection with a tender offer.

Prior to the 9th Circuit’s April 20, 2018 opinion, no Circuit split had existed. Over the course of the forty-five preceding years, the Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth and Eleventh Circuits had uniformly held that Section 14(e) required a plaintiff to plead scienter when stating a claim pursuant to Section 14(e). Despite four and half decades of consensus, the 9th Circuit concluded that every Circuit Court to address this particular issue previously had simply gotten it wrong and that if the Supreme Court considered the issue, the Supreme Court would conclude that Section 14(e) only required the plaintiff to plead negligence.

Until recently, plaintiffs had historically chosen to challenge tender offers in state court, most often Delaware state court, pursuant to state law disclosure obligations. Challenging tender offers is big business as almost every tender offer conducted results in multiple state court class action lawsuits seeking injunctions to halt the tender offers until so-called disclosure deficiencies are rectified. The cases are high profile, high risk and involve significant legal defense costs that D&O carriers often end up paying pursuant to the provisions of D&O insurance policies.  The plaintiff’s lawyers have historically been successful in playing the role of the troll under the bridge collecting hefty tolls (a.k.a legal fees) for “improving” disclosures in tender offers as the tender offer participants seek to avoid the risk of a potential injunction that could halt the tender offer.

Recently, however, the Delaware state courts where the majority of these cases have been pursued have been clamping down on these “disclosure claims” making the state court forum less lucrative for the plaintiff’s bar. Hence, the plaintiff’s bar has been turning increasingly to Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as an alternative cause of action in a federal forum in an effort to continue collecting their attorney fee tolls. The problem, however, is that if Section 14(e) requires the plaintiff to plead “scienter” and the plaintiff wants to bring a class action to put maximum pressure on the company, the plaintiff would have to comply with the heightened pleading requirements of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 and plead facts, not conclusory statements, sufficient to support a “strong inference” of scienter. The plaintiff’s bar would very much like to avoid this particular pleading, and burden of proof, hurdle.

So, the 9th Circuit’s decision adopting a mere negligence standard is a very big deal creating a window through which the plaintiff’s bar hopes to continue their troll under the bridge strategy at least out West and provides the plaintiff’s bar a new opportunity to challenge the prior holdings in the other Circuit Courts. The Supreme Court, however, has taken the opportunity to decide the issue and will either shut this particular door quickly or swing it wide open by deciding the issue of negligence or scienter for Section 14(e) claims.  Every securities lawyer in America will be watching closely.

If you have any questions or would like more information, please contact John Goselin at [email protected].

Limitations On Directors & Officers’ Liability Coverage

Posted on: December 20th, 2018

By: David Molinari

Directors and Officers (D&O) Liability Insurance is insurance coverage intended to protect individuals from personal losses if they are sued as a result of serving as a Director or Officer of a business or other type of organization. Directors and Officers policies may also cover legal fees and other costs the organization may incur as a result of such a lawsuit. Directors and Officers Liability Insurance applies to anyone who serves as a Director or Officer of a for-profit business or a non-profit organization. D&O policies can take on different forms depending on the nature of the organization and the risk organizations face. D&O Insurance is a specialized form of coverage for claims based on acts committed in corporate capacities; and the corporation obligation to indemnify its Directors and Officers for such claims.

The availability of such insurance is an important factor recruiting or attracting persons to serve as Directors and Officers of corporations. So important that such insurance is provided by statute.  In California, California Corporation Code Section 317 allows for a corporation to purchase and maintain insurance on behalf of any agent of the corporation against any liability asserted against or incurred by the agent in their official capacity; or arising out of the agent’s status, whether or not the corporation would have the power to indemnify the agent against the liability. However, the existence of Directors and Officers coverage has limits. California Corporation Code permits a corporation to purchase Directors and Officers Insurance, it does not require an entity to do so.  The Corporation Code does not authorize an insurance company to cover a risk that it could not or does not lawfully cover. A Directors and Officers Liability policy is not an incentive for leaders of a business to increase risky behavior or an incentive to adopt aggressive negotiation strategies, policies or interpretations or their contracts and arrangements in the belief that if their actions are rejected by the courts, the insurance company will pick up the tab.

One distinction where coverage is unavailable; yet individuals in positions of management, decision and control mistakenly believe they are covered, is in situations where the loss arises from nothing more than a breach of contract the corporation entered. Directors and Officers liability policies are seen as safety nets affording management the ability to shift risk for unsuccessful business decisions and deals to an insurance carrier.

Directors and Officers policies typically exclude coverage for breach of contract. The policies generally limit coverage to liability that arises from errors committed in the officers’ or directors’ official capacity.  This limitation effectively excludes contract liability because an officer acting in their official capacity cannot be held individually liable for breach of a corporate contract. The limitation protects against making an insurer an unwitting investor in a corporation’s dealings.

Often directors or officers seek coverage of claims by focusing upon broad language in policies that define a “loss” but ignore the conditions on how that loss arose. Under Directors and Officers policies, the issue is whether the loss resulted from a wrongful act. Policies only cover losses resulting from wrongful acts, whether actually committed or merely alleged. Suffering a loss does not include judicial enforcement of contractual obligations. An officer or directors’ decision to refuse to make payments under a contract because of a dispute with the contracting party does not give rise to a loss caused by a wrongful act. Even though an officer or director’s actions in precipitating the breach may have been careless, such a loss is not covered by a policy. If that were the case, any default arising from a mistaken assumption regarding a company’s contractual liability could transform a contract debt into an insured event. Refusing to pay a debt, even in reliance upon erroneous advice of counsel, would convert a contractual obligation into damage arising from a negligent omission. That result would make the insurance company a defacto party to a corporate contract and potentially require a carrier to pay a full contract price, with interest while letting the corporation completely off the hook for its voluntarily assumed obligations.

No insurer reasonably expects the benefits of a professional liability policy are available to cover a contract price for a business deal gone wrong.  Such expectations would expand the scope of an insurer’s liability enormously and unpredictably, creating a moral hazard problem by encouraging corporations to risk breaching their contractual obligations believing in the event of a suit, the D&O carrier would ultimately be responsible for paying the debt.

Recruiting qualified individuals into directors and officers positions in for-profit and non-profit organizations often requires additional benefits to entice acceptance of added responsibilities in corporate governance and decision making. In the non-profit realm, often individuals are volunteers, so additional benefits are often thought to be needed to recruit and fill these positions.  Directors and Officers Liability policies offer enticement and protection for assuming increased responsibilities. Yet, the existence of director and officer liability policies and the protections they afford should not encourage the opportunity to take greater risks in negotiations or contracting. Adopting a risky business strategy should not be undertaken in the misbelief that if the business deal goes wrong, insurance benefits are available to protect against the loss.

If you have any questions or would like more information, please contact David Molinari at [email protected].

FDIC Publicizes Failed Bank Settlements

Posted on: March 28th, 2013

By: Kelly Morrison

In an apparent response to criticism for their lack of transparency, the FDIC has published dozens of settlement agreements arising out of the now 106 lawsuits the agency has filed against failed banks. The FDIC has indicated that it will post additional settlement information by March 31.

These settlement agreements provide valuable insight to both insurance carriers and former directors and officers sued in their individual capacities. For instance, an August 2012 settlement agreement between the FDIC and Heritage Community Bank reflects a payment of $3.15 million—exclusively funded by the Bank’s D&O insurer.  Conversely, an April 2012 settlement arising from the Corn Belt Bank and Trust Company litigation shows that the individual defendants paid $266,000 out of pocket, while the D&O insurer chipped in another $700,000.

Those interested in perusing these settlement agreements for valuable insights on current cases may locate them here.

Georgia’s Failed Bank Litigation Addresses “Insured vs. Insured” Coverage Exclusion

Posted on: January 10th, 2013

By: Kelly Morrison

Georgia is no stranger to failed banks, and thus continues to host to a number of FDIC lawsuits against former directors and officers.  Not surprisingly, these lawsuits are testing the legal waters regarding several coverage exclusions, as D&O insurers batten down the hatches in anticipation of further lawsuits.

On January 4, 2013, Northern District of Georgia Judge Robert L. Vining, Jr., issued an opinion regarding the common “insured vs. insured” coverage exclusion.  This recurring issue addresses whether the FDIC’s claims as receiver for a failed bank against the bank’s former officers and directors triggers the standard D&O policy’s “insured vs. insured exclusion.”

The case arose from the failure of Omni National Bank of Atlanta.  After suit was instituted in March 2012, the bank’s D&O insurer filed a separate declaratory judgment action, seeking a holding that no coverage existed due to the FDIC’s role as receiver for Omni.  Essentially, the D&O insurer argued that the FDIC had “stepped into the shoes” of Omni Bank, and their subsequent claims against former officers and directors were thus barred under the insured vs. insured exclusion.

Judge Vining rejected this argument, finding the policy language ambiguous due to the FDIC’s “multiple roles” as governmental regulator and receiver, noting that receivership gave the agency power to act on behalf of the bank’s depositors, creditors, and shareholders.  This reasoning is consistent with an earlier holding from the District of Puerto Rico in October 2012.

Although the insurer can develop and renew this argument in the FDIC’s lawsuit, this is undoubtedly a negative development for D&O insurers, who can now expect to defend FDIC actions through the summary judgment stage, a much more expensive proposition than the quick exit offered by a declaratory judgment.

D&O Insurance Policies Now Tailored to Health Care Organizations

Posted on: October 12th, 2012

By: Kelly Morrison

The new wave of insurance policies explicitly addresses antitrust and HIPAA concerns unique to the medical industry.

Please visit the following link for more information: D&O Insurance for Healthcare Organizations: Our Prescription for Better Coverage.