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Posts Tagged ‘en banc’

Eleventh Circuit Again Rejects Claim That Title VII Prohibits Discrimination On The Basis Of Sexual Orientation

Posted on: July 23rd, 2018

By: Bill Buechner

In Bostock v. Clayton Co. Bd of Comm’rs, 723 F. App’x 964 (11th Cir. 2018), the Eleventh Circuit again held that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.   In doing so, the panel relied on prior circuit precedent in Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 138 S.Ct.  557 (2017) and Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1979).    Jack Hancock and Bill Buechner are representing the County in the case.

Last week, the Eleventh Circuit issued an order denying a request from a member of the Court for rehearing en banc.  Bostock v. Clayton Co. Bd. of Commissioners, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 19835,  2018 WL 3455013 (11th Cir. July 18, 2018).   The order was notable because it was accompanied by a dissent by two circuit judges sharply criticizing their colleagues for not agreeing to rehear the case en banc.

The plaintiff in Bostock had already filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court, and the County will be filing a response to that petition in the next few weeks.   The employer in Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc) also has filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court seeking review of the Second Circuit’s ruling that Title VII does prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.

We will report on the outcome of these pending petitions for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court.

If you have any questions or would like more information, please contact Bill Buechner at [email protected].

DOJ Fails to Challenge 5th Circuit Ruling Striking Fiduciary Rule

Posted on: May 3rd, 2018

By: Theodore C. Peters

On March 15, 2018, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal stuck down the “fiduciary rule” proposed by the Department of Labor (DOL), which required brokers to act in the best interests of their clients in retirement accounts.  Subsequently, there was much speculation as to whether the Department of Justice (DOJ), acting on behalf of the DOL, would appeal that decision.  The April 30, 2018 deadline for the DOJ to appeal came and went, but …. nothing.  The Fifth Circuit’s ruling, therefore, is slotted to take effect on May 7, 2018.

In late April, AARP and several state attorneys general (including California, New York and Oregon) joined forces in seeking the court’s permission to intervene as defendants in the case, and also sought an en banc hearing before the entire 17-judge circuit. AARP contends that the court’s decision striking down the DOL rule puts Americans’ retirement security at substantial risk, resulting in an “issue of exceptional importance.”  The plaintiffs in the case, opponents of the DOL rule, formally opposed the motions to intervene on April 30.  Counsel for the plaintiffs charged that the “last-minute motions do not come close to justifying their unprecedented bid to intervene…”

On May 2, the Fifth Circuit denied the intervenors’ motions.  The court’s decision looks to be the final nail in the coffin holding the DOL’s fiduciary rule.  Despite this ruling, however, the DOL still has one more card it could play – it can file a petition by June 13 to have the Supreme Court hear the case. Even if the DOL stands quietly by and does nothing, the Supreme Court could conceivably take the case up on its own.

Ultimately, this legal brouhaha focuses attention on the SEC, which is currently taking public comment on newly proposed standards of conduct for brokers and advisors.

If you have questions or would like more information, please contact Ted Peters at [email protected].

Salary History And Wage Gaps

Posted on: April 10th, 2018

By: Rebecca J. Smith

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit, which heard the case of Rizo v. Fresno County Office of Education en banc last year, has changed the 9th Circuit’s position and found that an employee’s prior salary – either alone or in a combination of factors – cannot be used to justify paying women less than men in comparable jobs.

“The Equal Pay Act stands for a principle as simple as it is just:  men and women should receive equal pay for equal work regardless of sex” Judge Stephen Reinhardt wrote in the opinion.   The opinion clearly establishes that an employer cannot justify a wage differential between male and female employees by relying on prior salary.

In the ruling made on Monday, April 09, 2018, the en banc panel overturned the earlier panel’s decision looking at the history of the act and indicating that Congress simply could not have intended to allow employers to rely on past discriminatory wages to justify continuing wage differentials.  One of the biggest issues, going forward after this decision will be whether negotiated salaries are included within the equal pay statutes.  Judge M. Margaret McKeown indicated in her concurring opinion that she was concerned about chilling voluntary discussions between employees or potential employees and employers when an employee is attempting to use prior salaries as a bargaining chip.

If you have any questions or would like more information, please contact Rebecca Smith at [email protected].

Second Circuit Joins Seventh Circuit In Holding That Title VII Prohibits Discrimination On Basis Of Sexual Orientation

Posted on: March 1st, 2018

By: Bill Buechner

The Second Circuit which covers New York, Connecticut and Vermont, has issued an en banc decision holding that Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Zarda v. Altitude Express, 2018 U.S. U.S. App. LEXIS 4608 (2d Cir. Feb. 26, 2018). The Seventh Circuit issued an en banc decision almost a year ago reaching the same conclusion.

The 10-3 decision is very lengthy and includes various concurring and dissenting opinions. The Second Circuit cited four primary grounds for its holding. First, the Court concluded that sexual orientation discrimination is merely a subset of sex discrimination, and that an employer cannot discriminate against an employee based on sexual orientation without reference to the employee’s sex. Second, the Court concluded that “but for” the employee’s sex, the employee would not have been terminated. In other words, the male employee was terminated because he is attracted to men, whereas a female employee who is attracted to men would not have been terminated. Third, the Court concluded that sexual orientation discrimination constitutes gender stereotyping that is unlawful under Price Waterhouse.  Finally, the Court concluded that sexual orientation discrimination constitutes association discrimination that is already prohibited by Title VII.

As previously discussed here, in Evans v. Georgia Regional Hospital, 850. F3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2017), the Eleventh Circuit re-affirmed prior circuit precedent and held that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.  The Eleventh Circuit subsequently declined to hear the case en banc, and the Supreme Court denied the plaintiff’s petition for certiorari in that case.

The Zarda decision increases the likelihood that other circuits (perhaps including the Eleventh Circuit) will revisit whether Title VII prohibits sexual orientation discrimination, and also increases the possibility that the Supreme Court may eventually decide to resolve this issue.  In the meantime, employers should monitor federal case law developments in their jurisdiction and keep in mind that the EEOC has taken the position that Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.

If you have any questions or would like additional information, you may contact Bill Buechner at [email protected].

En Banc Eleventh Circuit Decision May Substantially Undermine Judicial Estoppel Defense

Posted on: November 17th, 2017

By: William H. Buechner, Jr.

A  decision recently issued by the Eleventh Circuit sitting en banc may substantially undermine the judicial estoppel defense in employment cases.

A judicial estoppel defense may arise in many contexts, but the most common scenario is when the plaintiff files for bankruptcy, denies under oath the existence of any actual or potential claims on the bankruptcy schedules, obtains relief (either a complete discharge or confirmation of a reorganization plan) and then pursues (or continues to pursue) the claims that the plaintiff failed to disclose.  Under circumstances such as these, courts may bar a plaintiff from pursuing these claims, on the ground that such conduct makes a mockery of the judicial system by denying the existence of claims in one judicial forum and then pursuing those claims in another forum.  Courts also recognize that such conduct would permit the plaintiff to enrich himself to the detriment of the plaintiff’s creditors.  We have asserted the judicial estoppel defense successfully to defeat a number of employment claims.

In order to apply judicial estoppel, the defendant must establish that the plaintiff intended to make a mockery of the judicial system.  The Eleventh Circuit previously had held that a district court may infer this intent if the plaintiff knew about the omitted claim and had a motive to conceal it (which the plaintiff almost always does).  In Slater v. United States Steel Corp., 871 f.3D 1174 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc), the Eleventh Circuit reversed the dismissal of the plaintiff’s race and sex discrimination claims on the ground of judicial estoppel.  In doing so, the Eleventh Circuit overruled the precedent summarized above and held that the court should consider all the facts and circumstances of the case in deciding whether the plaintiff intended to make a mockery of the judicial system. Id. at 1185.  The Eleventh Circuit explained that the district court may consider factors such as (1) the plaintiff’s level of sophistication; (2) whether the plaintiff has corrected the non-disclosures and if, so, under what circumstances; (3) whether the plaintiff informed his bankruptcy attorney of the claim before filing the bankruptcy disclosures; and (4) whether the trustee or the creditors were aware of the claim before the plaintiff amended the disclosures. Id.

In announcing this totality of circumstances approach, the Eleventh Circuit suggested that, if the bankruptcy court allows the plaintiff to re-open the bankruptcy case to disclose the previously omitted claim, this factor may weigh against the application of judicial estoppel. Id. at 1186-1187.  In addition, the Eleventh Circuit resolved an intra-circuit conflict and held that judicial estoppel should not be applied in Chapter 7 cases where the claim belongs to the trustee, unless the trustee (rather than the plaintiff) fails to disclose the claim with the intent to make a mockery of the judicial system. Id. at 1184-1185, 1188 n.16.  Of course, a bankruptcy trustee seldom, if ever, engages in such conduct.

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision follows similar decisions in the Sixth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits, whereas the Fifth and Tenth Circuits continue to hold that the plaintiff’s intent may be inferred if the plaintiff knew about the omitted claim and had a motive to conceal it.  Given this circuit split, it is possible that the Supreme Court may address this issue at some point in the future.

Absent intervention by the Supreme Court, it may be much more difficult for employers in the Eleventh Circuit to prevail on a judicial estoppel defense as a result of the Slater decision.

If you have any questions or would like more information, please contact Bill Buechner at [email protected].