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Posts Tagged ‘law enforcement’

California Police Deadly Force Statute: Law or Guidance?

Posted on: January 28th, 2020

By: Caleb Saggus

The California State Legislature recently enacted a criminal statute aimed at police officer use of force, which went into effect January 1, 2020  (Assembly Bill 392).  Prior California state law permitted an officer to use reasonable force to effect an arrest and deemed a homicide justifiable when necessarily committed in arresting a person who has committed a felony and the person is fleeing or resisting such arrest.  Case law deems such a homicide to be a seizure within the Fourth Amendment and, accordingly, requires the actions to be objectively reasonable.

AB 392 narrows the focus of this inquiry, at least for determining when an officer commits criminal homicide in the line of duty, and provides a reasonableness determination explicitly.  The Act provides that “a peace officer is justified in using deadly force upon another person only when the officer reasonably believes, based on the totality of the circumstances, that such force is necessary for either of the following reasons: (A) To defend against an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury to the officer or to another person.  (B) To apprehend a fleeing person for any felony that threatened or resulted in death or serious bodily injury, if the officer reasonably believes that the person will cause death or serious bodily injury to another unless immediately apprehended.”

Although this law provides substantive parameters on police use of deadly force and utilizes a framework that generally can aid courts in deciding whether an officer has committed criminal homicide, the law may not significantly affect civil excessive force claims in California.

Most excessive force claims are brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to vindicate a constitutional violation—generally the Fourth Amendment.  A state criminal statute cannot alter the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and thus this Act should not have any bearing on the merits of a civil § 1983 excessive force claim.  Thus, the more prominent effect this Act might have is to serve as a model for other states to utilize in molding their own criminal statutes and best practices training.  Such statutes, while not providing a viable vehicle for plaintiffs to seek civil redress, might nonetheless be seen as a State’s view on the extent to which deadly force should or should not be used by police officers.  Therefore, the reach of these types of statutes might more practically be seen in a trickle-down to police officer training than in use of force civil litigation. If nothing else, AB 392 and other statutes like it represent the public’s shifting attitude towards police use of force and what constitutes “reasonable” force.

If you have any questions or would like more information, please contact Caleb Saggus at [email protected]

California Attempts to Change Standard of Liability for Use of Force Claims

Posted on: August 29th, 2019

By: Sara Brochstein

Earlier this month, California enacted a new measure that goes into effect in 2020 altering the use of deadly force standard for law enforcement officers. The law was originally introduced in response to the March 2018 shooting of Stephon Clark in Sacramento.

The new standard dictates that the use of deadly force is acceptable only when it is “necessary in defense of human life” and no other alternatives are available.  And in determining whether deadly force is necessary, officers are required to evaluate each situation in light of the particular circumstances of each case and use other available resources and techniques if reasonably safe and feasible to an objectively reasonable officer.

This is a departure from the federal standard of whether the officer’s use of deadly force was “objectively reasonable” as addressed by the Supreme Court in Tennessee v. Garner (1985) and Graham v. Connor (1989).  However, the new law fails to set forth a specific definition of “necessary,” which would leave interpretation to the courts on a case-by-case basis. Thus, while many view the new standard as “heightened,” it remains to be seen whether it will yield different results.

If you have any questions or would like more information, please contact Sara Brochstein at [email protected].

“Sanctuary Cities” Get a Reprieve For Now

Posted on: January 10th, 2019

By: Pamela Everett

As many city, county and state attorneys are aware, in 2017 the US. Department of Justice (DOJ) added three conditions to the application process for the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (“Byrne JAG”) program in an effort to eliminate so called sanctuary cities. The Byrne JAG program originated from the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,  which created grants to assist the law enforcement efforts of state and local authorities. Under the Byrne JAG program, states and localities may apply for funds to support criminal justice programs in a variety of categories, including law enforcement, prosecution, crime prevention, corrections, drug treatment, technology, victim and witness services, and mental health.

The first condition, called the “Notice Condition” requires grantees, upon request, to give advance notice to the Department of Homeland Security of the scheduled release date and time of aliens housed in state or local correctional facilities. The second condition, called the “Access Condition,” requires grantees to give federal agents access to aliens in state or local correctional facilities in order to question them about their immigration status. The third condition, called the “Compliance Condition” requires grantees to certify their compliance with 8 U.S.C. § 1373, which prohibits states and localities from restricting their officials from communicating with immigration authorities regarding anyone’s citizenship or immigration status. Grantees are also required to monitor any subgrantees’ compliance with the three conditions, and to notify DOJ if they become aware of credible evidence of a violation of the Compliance Condition. Additionally, all grantees must certify their compliance with the three conditions, which carries the risk of criminal prosecution, civil penalties, and administrative remedies. The DOJ also requires the jurisdictions’’ legal counsel to certify compliance with the conditions.

A number of jurisdictions have sued the DOJ and the U. S. Attorney General regarding these new conditions and sought a nationwide injunction; however, so far, none have  been successful in obtaining a nationwide injunction.  Recently a partial win was handed to the states of New York, Connecticut, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Washington, and Commonwealths of Massachusetts and Virginia and the City of New York. The States and the City challenged the imposition of the three conditions on five bases: (1) the conditions violates the separation of powers, (2) the conditions were ultra vires under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), (3) the conditions were not in accordance with law under the APA, (4) the conditions were arbitrary and capricious under the APA, and (5) § 1373 violated the Tenth Amendment’s prohibition on commandeering.  This case challenged the authority of the Executive Branch of the federal government to compel states to adopt its preferred immigration policies by imposing conditions on congressionally authorized funding to which the states are otherwise entitled.

While the court held that the plaintiffs did not make a sufficient showing of nationwide impact to demonstrate that a nationwide injunction was necessary to provide relief to them, it did find as follows: (1) The Notice, Access, and Compliance Conditions were ultra vires and not in accordance with law under the APA. (2) 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a)–(b), insofar as it applies to states and localities, is facially unconstitutional under the anticommandeering doctrine of the Tenth Amendment. (3)  The Notice, Access, and Compliance Conditions violated the constitutional separation of powers. (4)The Notice, Access, and Compliance Conditions were arbitrary and capricious under the APA.  (5) The DOJ was mandated to reissue the States’ FY 2017 Byrne JAG award documents without the Notice, Access, or Compliance Conditions, and upon acceptance to disburse those awards as they would in the ordinary course without regard to those conditions.  Additionally, the DOJ was prohibited from imposing or enforcing the Notice, Access, or Compliance Conditions for FY 2017 Byrne JAG funding for the States, the City, or any of their agencies or political subdivisions.

The DOJ was prohibited from imposing or enforcing the Notice, Access, or Compliance Conditions for FY 2017 Byrne JAG funding for the States, the City, or any of their agencies or political subdivisions.

There are several other cases pending, including one filed by the City of San Francisco, seeking the issuance of a nationwide injunction to prohibit the enforcement of the new conditions. Stay tuned for more developments in this area.

If you have any questions or would like more information, please contact Pamela Everett at [email protected].

 

Related litigation: City of Chicago v. Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d 933 (N.D. Ill. 2017); affd. appeal, City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272 (7th Cir. 2018), but later stayed the nationwide scope of the injunction pending en banc review. Conference City of Evanston v. Sessions, No. 18 Civ. 4853, slip op. at 11 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 9, 2018) City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 579 (E.D. Pa. 2017); City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, 309 F. Supp. 3d 289 (E.D. Pa. 2018)(currently on appeal); California ex rel. Becerra v. Sessions, 284 F. Supp. 3d 1015 (N.D. Cal. 2018)

 

Are We Witnessing the End of Qualified Immunity?

Posted on: September 19th, 2018

By: Sun Choy

For many decades, qualified immunity has served as a powerful defense to end civil cases against public officials, including law enforcement officers for the alleged use of excessive force.  Given the many high-profile deaths involving the use of force by officers, progressives have again called for the end of qualified immunity.  Even some conservatives are now calling for an end to qualified immunity.  In a recent National Review article, the author lays out a conservative rationale to end qualified immunity, which is primarily based on the “plain meaning” of the statutory language of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  With progressives and conservatives joining forces, is it only a matter of time before the Supreme Court ends qualified immunity?

If you have any questions or would like more information, please contact Sun Choy at [email protected].

Does the Fourth Amendment Allow a Forced Blood Draw After a DUI Arrest?

Posted on: January 14th, 2013

By: Sun Choy

The Supreme Court will answer this question in Missouri v. McNeely.  It is well established that the Fourth Amendment allows a warrantless search under exigent circumstances.  During the oral argument last week, the Court suggested that increased technology may diminish the need for warrantless searches.  With advancements in instant communications, a warrant may be a few text messages away.  Of course, this is an over simplification, but it raises some intriguing questions about the role of technology in law enforcement.  With existing technology, one can easily envision a procedure where an officer appears before a neutral magistrate via a smart phone video feed and an electronic warrant is issued via email.  Accordingly, technology may render warrantless searches less reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.  It will be interesting to see how the Court addresses this interplay between technology and the Fourth Amendment in Missouri v. McNeely.