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Posts Tagged ‘Securities Exchange Act’

Federal Securities Laws: Has the 9th Circuit Gone Rogue Again?

Posted on: February 4th, 2019

By: John Goselin

On January 4, 2019, the United States Supreme Court decided to hear an appeal from the Ninth Circuit’s April 20, 2018 decision in Varjabedian v. Emulex Corporation, 888 F.3d 399 (9th Cir. 2018). The Supreme Court is hearing this case to resolve a circuit split regarding whether a claim under Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires the plaintiff to plead a strong inference that the defendants acted with scienter (i.e. intent to defraud) or whether Section 14(e) merely requires an allegation that the defendants were negligent. Section 14(e) is a provision of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 that prohibits a company involved in a tender offer from making a material misstatement or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading or to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative acts or practices in connection with a tender offer.

Prior to the 9th Circuit’s April 20, 2018 opinion, no Circuit split had existed. Over the course of the forty-five preceding years, the Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth and Eleventh Circuits had uniformly held that Section 14(e) required a plaintiff to plead scienter when stating a claim pursuant to Section 14(e). Despite four and half decades of consensus, the 9th Circuit concluded that every Circuit Court to address this particular issue previously had simply gotten it wrong and that if the Supreme Court considered the issue, the Supreme Court would conclude that Section 14(e) only required the plaintiff to plead negligence.

Until recently, plaintiffs had historically chosen to challenge tender offers in state court, most often Delaware state court, pursuant to state law disclosure obligations. Challenging tender offers is big business as almost every tender offer conducted results in multiple state court class action lawsuits seeking injunctions to halt the tender offers until so-called disclosure deficiencies are rectified. The cases are high profile, high risk and involve significant legal defense costs that D&O carriers often end up paying pursuant to the provisions of D&O insurance policies.  The plaintiff’s lawyers have historically been successful in playing the role of the troll under the bridge collecting hefty tolls (a.k.a legal fees) for “improving” disclosures in tender offers as the tender offer participants seek to avoid the risk of a potential injunction that could halt the tender offer.

Recently, however, the Delaware state courts where the majority of these cases have been pursued have been clamping down on these “disclosure claims” making the state court forum less lucrative for the plaintiff’s bar. Hence, the plaintiff’s bar has been turning increasingly to Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as an alternative cause of action in a federal forum in an effort to continue collecting their attorney fee tolls. The problem, however, is that if Section 14(e) requires the plaintiff to plead “scienter” and the plaintiff wants to bring a class action to put maximum pressure on the company, the plaintiff would have to comply with the heightened pleading requirements of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 and plead facts, not conclusory statements, sufficient to support a “strong inference” of scienter. The plaintiff’s bar would very much like to avoid this particular pleading, and burden of proof, hurdle.

So, the 9th Circuit’s decision adopting a mere negligence standard is a very big deal creating a window through which the plaintiff’s bar hopes to continue their troll under the bridge strategy at least out West and provides the plaintiff’s bar a new opportunity to challenge the prior holdings in the other Circuit Courts. The Supreme Court, however, has taken the opportunity to decide the issue and will either shut this particular door quickly or swing it wide open by deciding the issue of negligence or scienter for Section 14(e) claims.  Every securities lawyer in America will be watching closely.

If you have any questions or would like more information, please contact John Goselin at [email protected].

Is the SEC Mortal After All?

Posted on: August 27th, 2018

By:Ted Peters

The Securities and Exchange Commission, created through the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, is without a doubt one of the most powerful regulatory agencies in the free world.  According to its website, the SEC’s mission is “to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.” Since its inception, the Commission has wielded great power, and in many instances has pushed the envelope to expand that power. But, as reflected in a handful of recent landmark cases, courts around the country and even this nation’s highest court have pushed back making clear that the Commission’s authority is not unlimited.

The SEC initiates enforcement actions in federal court when it determines that a violation of securities law has occurred. Like any other plaintiff, the SEC is subject to statutes of limitation.  The statute governing enforcement actions is five (5) years.  28 U.S.C. § 2462.  Section 2462 provides that, “an action, suit or proceeding for the enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise, shall not be entertained unless commenced within five years from the date when the claim first accrued.”

Historically, the Commission has acted with the belief that Section 2462 applied only to the specific enforcement actions enumerated therein.  The SEC’s own enforcement manual provides that “certain claims are not subject to the five-year statue of limitations under Section 2462, including claims for injunctive relief.” (See § 3.1.2 (Nov. 28, 2017)).

In Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635 (2017), the United States Supreme Court ruled that Section 2462 extends to disgorgement claims.  Prior to Kokesh, the Commission had taken the position that disgorgement claims could reach back indefinitely.  Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Sotomayor stated that “[d]isgorgement in the securities-enforcement context is a ‘penalty’ within the meaning of § 2462.”  The Court explained that disgorgement operates as a sanction because it redressed a wrong to the public, as opposed to an individual.  The Court rejected the SEC’s argument that disgorgement is remedial, finding instead that it was punitive because it “does not simply restore the status quo,” and often “leaves the defendant worse off.”

Prior to the Court’s decision in Kokesh, the SEC initiated an enforcement action in SEC v. Cohen, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121164 E.D.N.Y. (Jul. 12, 2018), in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York.  In that action, the Commission asserted that between 2007-2012, the defendants participated in a scheme that involved making improper payments to government officials in a number of African countries.  As typical, the Commission sought recovery of monetary penalties, disgorgement and injunctive (follow-the-law) relief.  While the action was pending, Kokesh was decided.  Following Kokesh, the Cohen court held that Section 2462 also extended to actions for injunctive relief.  Finding that the SEC’s demand for injunctive relief would operate, at least in part, as a penalty, the court concluded that the claims were time-barred.

But not every court addressing injunctive relief has reached the same result.  In SEC v. Collyard, 861 F.3d 760 (8th Cir. 2017), a case decided after Kokesh, the Eighth Circuit, acknowledging a split of authority over whether an injunction can be a “penalty” for purposes of Section 2462, concluded that the at-issue injunction entered by the district court was not a penalty and, therefore, not subject to Section 2462.  That injunction enjoined the defendant from violating Securities Exchange Act § 15(a) and the district court concluded that the defendant was “reasonably likely to violate Section 15(a) again unless enjoined.”  Upholding that determination, the Eighth Circuit remarked that “[n]ot every injunction that specifically deters an individual is imposed to punish.”

After Kokesh, it is clear that SEC disgorgement actions fall within the limitations of Section 2462.  As for injunctive relief, district courts around the country remain split.  Given the importance of the SEC’s ability to seek injunctive relief, it is likely that the Supreme Court may be called upon to settle the split, perhaps through a possible certiorari of Cohen. Regardless, these recent decisions undeniably provide defendants with more leverage when facing the SEC.

If you have questions or would like more information, please contact Ted Peters  at [email protected].

Supreme Court to Revisit Liability Under Rule 10b-5 – Will Prospective Justice Kavanaugh Weigh In?

Posted on: July 25th, 2018

By: Ted Peters

Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, and Rule 10b-5 promulgated under it, makes certain conduct in connection with the purchase or sale of any security unlawful.  Specifically, Rule 10b-5(a) prohibits the use of any “device, scheme, or artifice to defraud.”  10b-5(b) prohibits the use of any “untrue statement of a material fact” or the omission of any “material fact necessary in order to make the statements… not misleading.”  And 10b-5(c) prohibits “any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.”

In Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011), the United States Supreme Court addressed whether a mutual fund investment adviser could be held liable under Rule 10b-5 for false statements included in its client mutual funds’ prospectuses.  The Court concluded that the adviser could not be held liable under the rule because it did not make the statements in the prospectuses.

In Lorenzo v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 872 F.3d 578 (2017), the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeal considered whether a registered representative of a broker-dealer, who allegedly emailed false and misleading statements prepared by his boss to investors, could be found liable under Rule 10b-5.  Initially, the case was tried before an Administrative Law Judge who concluded that Lorenzo’s boss had drafted the emails in question; Lorenzo did not read the text of the emails; and Lorenzo had “sent the emails without even thinking about the contents.”  The judge also found that the emails were sent “at the request” of Lorenzo’s boss.  Notwithstanding these findings, the judge nevertheless concluded that Lorenzo had willfully violated securities laws (i.e., that Lorenzo had acted with an intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud).  As a sanction, the judge not only fined Lorenzo, but also imposed a lifetime suspension effectively barring him from the securities industry.

Lorenzo appealed the ruling before the Securities Exchange Commission.  The Commission affirmed, concluding that Lorenzo himself was “responsible” for the contents of the emails his boss asked him to send even though it was undisputed that Lorenzo’s boss had prepared the contents of the emails and that Lorenzo had simply “cut and pasted” the contents into the emails at issue.  Notably, the SEC found that Lorenzo’s conduct triggered liability under each of the subparts of Rule 10b-5, including 10b-5(b) which, under Janus, necessarily required an affirmative finding that Lorenzo had actually “made” the statements in question.

Lorenzo next appealed to the D.C. Circuit Court.  On September 29, 2017, a divided court upheld the SEC’s determination.  The court agreed that there was substantial evidence that the statements in Lorenzo’s emails were false or misleading and that Lorenzo possessed the requisite intent to mislead, deceive or defraud. However, the court disagreed with the SEC’s determination that Lorenzo was the “maker” of the statements as required by Rule 10b-5(b).  “We conclude that Lorenzo did not ‘make’ the false statements at issue for purposes of Rule 10b-5(b) because Lorenzo’s boss, and not Lorenzo himself, retained ‘ultimate authority’ over the statements.” [Citing Janus.]  On this basis, the court set aside the sanctions and remanded the case to enable the SEC to reassess appropriate penalties.

Judge Brett Kavanaugh, the current presidential nominee to fill the vacancy left by Justice Kennedy, penned a strongly worded dissent.  Kavanaugh criticized the conclusion reached by his colleagues that the “scheme liability” provisions of Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) may be used to find liability even where the defendant is not the “maker” of the statements (and thus not liable under 10b-5(b)).

On June 18, 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court granted the petition for writ of certiorari.  The question before the Supreme Court is simple: Can a defendant be held liable under the so-called scheme liability provisions of Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) in connection with using false or misleading statements, even if that defendant is not the “maker” of the statements?  That the Court accepted certiorari certainly suggests that the Court desires to further define the scope and limitations of Rule 10b-5.

Should Kavanaugh be confirmed as the next Supreme Court Justice, it remains to be seen whether he will recuse himself on the grounds that he heard the case below.  If he does, then the Court could well end up with a 4-4 split, which would effectively affirm the lower court’s ruling.  The Court’s four more liberal justices (Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor and Kagan) each dissented from Janus.  On the other hand, if Kavanaugh is confirmed and does not recuse himself, the majority of the Court will likely endorse a more restrictive interpretation of scheme liability under Rule 10b-5.

If you have questions or would like more information, please contact Ted Peters at [email protected].