CLOSE X
RSS Feed LinkedIn Instagram Twitter Facebook
Search:
FMG Law Blog Line

Posts Tagged ‘Title VII’

Discrimination Without A Difference: Supreme Court To Decide Whether Section 1981 Requires “But For” Causation Or Whether Same-Decision Defense Applies

Posted on: June 24th, 2019

By: Michael Hill

The U.S. Supreme Court is poised to answer the question of where to draw the line when a decision is motivated in part by race discrimination. Must the plaintiff show the decision would not have been made but for his or her race, or is it sufficient to show that race was one factor behind the decision, even if the same decision would have been made for other, race-neutral reasons?

The case at issue, Comcast Corp. v. National Assoc. of African American-Owned Media, is not actually an employment discrimination case, but the Supreme Court’s decision will impact the realm of employment law because of the statute at issue, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (“Section 1981”), prohibits race discrimination in making and enforcing contracts (which includes employment contracts).

The issue is whether Section 1981 requires “but for” causation, or whether a “mixed motive” analysis can be used. In Comcast, an African American-owned television network operator sued the cable company, alleging Comcast’s refusal to contract with the networks was racially motivated. The federal district court in California dismissed the case three times at the pleading stage, holding the complaints failed to allege facts to show Comcast had no legitimate business reasons for its decision not to contract with the networks. On appeal, a three-judge panel at the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously reversed, holding a Section 1981 claim can proceed as long as race is alleged to have been one factor in the contract decision, even if there were other, race-neutral factors that would have led to the same decision.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Comcast will have a significant impact on the amount of damages available in cases alleges race discrimination in employment. Race discrimination claims under Section 1981 frequently are pled in tandem with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Title VII was amended in 1991 expressly to allow for “mixed motive” claims, but the only forms of relief available under a Title VII “mixed motive” claim are declaratory relief and attorney’s fees – no damages, back pay, or right to reinstatement. The language of Section 1981, however, contains no such limitation. Also, unlike Title VII, damages under Section 1981 are not capped; the statute of limitations is longer; and there is no requirement to submit the claim to the EEOC before suing in court. Thus, if the Supreme Court rules that Section 1981 covers “mixed motive” claims (and not just claims of “but for” discrimination), then claims alleging “mixed motive” race discrimination could become more valuable (and thus more costly to defend).

If you have questions or would like more information, please contact Michael Hill at [email protected].

FMG Client Headed to Supreme Court in Landmark Title VII Case to Resolve LGBT Employment Standards

Posted on: April 23rd, 2019

The Supreme Court yesterday agreed to review two federal circuit court decisions that reached differing conclusions as to whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 covers sexual orientation. For approximately 40 years, the EEOC and the federal circuit courts have unanimously held that Title VII does not encompass sexual orientation. The EEOC changed its position in 2014 and determined that Title VII encompasses sexual orientation. The Seventh Circuit likewise reversed its position in 2017, and the Second Circuit changed its position in early 2018 and held in Zarda v. Altitude Express that Title VII encompasses sexual orientation. Later in 2018, the Eleventh Circuit re-affirmed circuit precedent and held in Bostock v. Clayton County that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. The Supreme Court agreed to review Bostock and Zarda and consolidated the two cases.

Freeman Mathis and Gary, LLP represents Clayton County in Bostock and will argue that Title VII does not apply to a claim of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.

In addition, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Sixth Circuit case of R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes v. EEOC. That case raises the question of whether Title VII provides protection to transgender persons. That case is similar in some regard to the Bostock and Zarda cases, however, their distinctions are evident in that the Court did not consolidate the Harris case with Bostock and Zarda.

In granting certiorari in the Harris case, the Supreme Court may revisit a concept outlined in its 1989 decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, which held that it was unlawful sex discrimination under Title VII to discriminate against employees because they do not conform to ideas of how a certain gender should behave.

These cases will be argued and decided sometime during the Court’s 2019-2020 term, which begins in October.

If you have any questions or would like more information, please contact us at [email protected].

How Do You Like Them Apples? Eleventh Circuit Slices Up New “Comparator” Standard for Intentional Discrimination Cases

Posted on: March 26th, 2019

By: Tim Boughey

Last week, in Lewis v. City of Union City, Ga. et al., No. 15-11362 (11th Cir. March 21, 2019) (en banc), the Eleventh Circuit issued an important decision addressing the proper comparator analysis applied to circumstantial claims of intentional discrimination (whether under Title VII, Equal Protection, or Section 1981).  At the core of every discrimination case, the employee must produce evidence the employer acted with an impermissible, discriminatory motive or else suffer the dismissal of their case at summary judgment. In most discrimination cases, the employee lacks direct evidence of discrimination – such as clearly sexist, racist, or similarly discriminatory statements or actions by the employer in connection with an employment decision. Without direct evidence, the employee must instead come forth with circumstantial evidence supporting an inference of intentional discrimination. In most cases, the employee proceeds down the familiar McDonnell Douglas framework and attempts to establish that the employer treated a so-called “similarly situated” employee outside of the employee’s protected class more favorably (in lawyer speak a “comparator”).

Over the years, the Eleventh Circuit made efforts to define “similarly situated”, and by its own admission, created something of a “hash” of the concept. In some cases, the Eleventh Circuit defined “similarly situated” to mean “same or similar” and in others as “nearly identical.” In more colloquial terms, the Eleventh Circuit summarized the “similarly situated” concept as one that prevents courts from second-guessing an employer’s reasonable decisions and confusing “apples with oranges.” Faced with the issue of reconciling differing and nebulous definitions, the Eleventh Circuit did some house cleaning Thursday and held “similarly situated” means “similar in all material respects.” In addition, the Eleventh Circuit held courts must apply this standard on the front end of the McDonnell Douglas analysis (commonly referred to as the prima facie stage) before an employer must articulate its legitimate, non-discriminatory reason(s) for making an employment decision.

With the spirit of providing employers “the necessary breathing space to make business judgments,” the Eleventh Circuit provided some guide posts for assessing whether or not an alleged comparator is “similar in all material respects.” Fleshing out the concept, the Eleventh Circuit indicated that a “similarly situated” employee is someone who, when compared to the employee bringing a discrimination claim, (1) engaged in the same basic conduct (or misconduct); (2) is subjected to the same employment policy, guideline, or rule; (3) reports to the same supervisor; and (4) shares the same employment or disciplinary history. The Eleventh Circuit then applied these standards to Lewis’ claims of discrimination and found she flunked the test because the employer applied a different employment policy (implemented two years after her termination) to her two alleged comparators.

This new “similar in all material respects” standard is most important for Human Resources professionals, supervisors, and employment counsel to public and private sector employers on the front lines of cases involving disciplinary action. In this regard, employers should look to past disciplinary decisions under the same work rule and supervisor as well as disciplinary history before making the call to toss a rotten apple from its workforce.

If you have any questions or would like more information, please contact Tim Boughey at [email protected].

Eleventh Circuit Again Rejects Claim That Title VII Prohibits Discrimination On The Basis Of Sexual Orientation

Posted on: July 23rd, 2018

By: Bill Buechner

In Bostock v. Clayton Co. Bd of Comm’rs, 723 F. App’x 964 (11th Cir. 2018), the Eleventh Circuit again held that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.   In doing so, the panel relied on prior circuit precedent in Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 138 S.Ct.  557 (2017) and Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1979).    Jack Hancock and Bill Buechner are representing the County in the case.

Last week, the Eleventh Circuit issued an order denying a request from a member of the Court for rehearing en banc.  Bostock v. Clayton Co. Bd. of Commissioners, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 19835,  2018 WL 3455013 (11th Cir. July 18, 2018).   The order was notable because it was accompanied by a dissent by two circuit judges sharply criticizing their colleagues for not agreeing to rehear the case en banc.

The plaintiff in Bostock had already filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court, and the County will be filing a response to that petition in the next few weeks.   The employer in Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc) also has filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court seeking review of the Second Circuit’s ruling that Title VII does prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.

We will report on the outcome of these pending petitions for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court.

If you have any questions or would like more information, please contact Bill Buechner at [email protected].

Second Circuit Joins Seventh Circuit In Holding That Title VII Prohibits Discrimination On Basis Of Sexual Orientation

Posted on: March 1st, 2018

By: Bill Buechner

The Second Circuit which covers New York, Connecticut and Vermont, has issued an en banc decision holding that Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Zarda v. Altitude Express, 2018 U.S. U.S. App. LEXIS 4608 (2d Cir. Feb. 26, 2018). The Seventh Circuit issued an en banc decision almost a year ago reaching the same conclusion.

The 10-3 decision is very lengthy and includes various concurring and dissenting opinions. The Second Circuit cited four primary grounds for its holding. First, the Court concluded that sexual orientation discrimination is merely a subset of sex discrimination, and that an employer cannot discriminate against an employee based on sexual orientation without reference to the employee’s sex. Second, the Court concluded that “but for” the employee’s sex, the employee would not have been terminated. In other words, the male employee was terminated because he is attracted to men, whereas a female employee who is attracted to men would not have been terminated. Third, the Court concluded that sexual orientation discrimination constitutes gender stereotyping that is unlawful under Price Waterhouse.  Finally, the Court concluded that sexual orientation discrimination constitutes association discrimination that is already prohibited by Title VII.

As previously discussed here, in Evans v. Georgia Regional Hospital, 850. F3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2017), the Eleventh Circuit re-affirmed prior circuit precedent and held that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.  The Eleventh Circuit subsequently declined to hear the case en banc, and the Supreme Court denied the plaintiff’s petition for certiorari in that case.

The Zarda decision increases the likelihood that other circuits (perhaps including the Eleventh Circuit) will revisit whether Title VII prohibits sexual orientation discrimination, and also increases the possibility that the Supreme Court may eventually decide to resolve this issue.  In the meantime, employers should monitor federal case law developments in their jurisdiction and keep in mind that the EEOC has taken the position that Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.

If you have any questions or would like additional information, you may contact Bill Buechner at [email protected].