CLOSE X
RSS Feed LinkedIn Instagram Twitter Facebook
Search:
FMG Law Blog Line

Posts Tagged ‘Court of Appeals’

Winemakers Decan’t Warn a Consumer About Every Risk

Posted on: May 16th, 2018

A Pour Result for Plaintiffs’ Attorneys in California, but a Grape Win for Vintners

By: Robyn Flegal

In May 2018, the California Court of Appeals refused to revive a class action lawsuit claiming wines made by fifteen winemakers should contain an arsenic warning. The lawsuit was originally filed in 2015, alleging that these wines exposed consumers to arsenic in violation of California law. The panel of the California Court of Appeals held that the alcoholic beverage warning on these wines sufficiently notified customers about the potential risks associated with consuming the wine, despite the lack of a specific arsenic warning.

California’s Proposition 65—the safe drinking water and toxic enforcement act of 1986—protects the state’s drinking water sources from being contaminated with chemicals known to cause cancer, birth defects, or other reproductive harms. Prop 65 requires businesses to disclose exposures to such chemicals to Californians.

The appeals court held that the Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment requires companies to disclose one chemical for each health risk. Thus, because the alcoholic beverage warning alerted customers that wine could result in cancer and reproductive harm, the additional arsenic warning was unnecessary. The failure to provide a separate arsenic warning was therefore not a violation of the regulations.

Companies doing business in California should be aware of Proposition 65 and the labeling and disclosure requirements thereunder. For more information, please contact Robyn Flegal at [email protected] or any of FMG’s Commercial Litigation Professionals.

Antisocial Media: Court Critical of Cop Capturing Curious Citizen’s Cellphone

Posted on: April 23rd, 2018

By: E. Charles Reed, Jr.

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a police officer violates clearly established law by seizing a bystander’s cellphone at an accident scene in the absence of exigent circumstances.

With the rise of social media and the availability of devices with cameras, newsworthy events and potential evidence of criminal or civil liability can be captured by citizens with fortuitous timing and cellphones. While the methodology of capturing potential evidence has changed, constitutional principles associated with law enforcement’s gathering of that evidence has not. One law enforcement official recently learned this lesson the hard way in Crocker v. Beatty, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 8290 (Apr. 2, 2018).

In May 2012, Deputy Steven Beatty arrived at an accident scene involving an overturned SUV.  By the time Beatty had arrived, several bystanders, including a citizen named James Crocker, had taken photographs and video of the scene with their cell phones. Crocker captured images of empty beer bottles, the overturned vehicle and emergency personnel, but no images of the persons involved in the accident. Beatty approached Crocker, took his cellphone and instructed him to leave the area and wait for instructions about when his phone would be returned. Crocker refused to leave and offered to delete the footage in return for his phone. Instead, Beatty placed Crocker under arrest for resisting an officer without violence.

On appeal at the summary judgment stage, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the trial court’s denial of qualified immunity for Beatty. First, the court rejected the argument that Beatty’s seizure was justified by exigent circumstances because Crocker was a non-suspect bystander with no motive to delete any photographs. The fact that Crocker’s cellphone could later be lost did not create an exigency.

More importantly, the Court held that the right to be free from warrantless seizures of personal property was established with “obvious clarity” in May 2012 such that Beatty should have known his conduct violated federal law. “Our case law has sent a consistent message, predating 2012, about the warrantless seizure of personal property and how exigent circumstances may arise. The technology of the iPhone simply does not change our analysis. To hold otherwise would deal a devastating blow to the Fourth Amendment in the face of sweeping technological advancement. These advancements do not create ambiguities in Fourth Amendment law; the principles remain as always. Because of this, Beatty is not entitled to qualified immunity.”

The Court did not address, and may not have been presented with, the policy implications for agencies responding to mass-casualty or critical incidents in metropolitan centers – where hundreds of witnesses may be present, each with different video clips taken at different times and from different angles.  However, the takeaway from this case is while technology may push products further and further into the future, the prudent law enforcement officer will apply the legal authority of the past to minimize being held liable for his or her actions.

Charles Reed is member of Freeman, Mathis, & Gary’s Government Section and regularly defends government employees in in civil rights cases.  He can be reached at [email protected] or by phone at 678-399-6351.

Ordinarily, Is It Professional Negligence? Georgia Supreme Court Thinks So In $22 Million Reversal

Posted on: April 17th, 2018

By: Shaun Daugherty

The Georgia appellate courts have addressed the issues between claims of ordinary and professional negligence in medical malpractice cases for a number of years.  The standards for liability are distinctly different, but in certain factual scenarios there may be a fine line drawn between the two.  The Georgia Supreme Court made a clear distinction on the issue last month in reversing a $22 million dollar compensatory verdict awarded in Southeastern Pain Specialists v. Brown.  This was after the same verdict had been affirmed by the Court of Appeals that found no error in the trial court charging the jury on both ordinary and professional negligence.

The Georgia Supreme Court had some clear leanings regarding the quality of care that was provided in the underlying lawsuit according to the evidence presented at trial.  The case involved an epidural steroid injection procedure where a pulse oximeter and blood pressure cuff were placed on the patient for monitoring while she was administered anesthesia face down.  During the procedure, the evidence was that the pulse oximeter read 0% and the blood pressure cuff registered no reading for a significant amount of time.  The evidence was that the defendant doctor, with knowledge of the readings, continued the procedure insisting that everything was fine.  After the 18-minute procedure, the patient was repositioned on her back and did not recover as expected.  She was taken to the local ER for further care and the defendant doctor indicated to the medical personnel that the patient was having complications from the anesthesia.  He failed to provide any information regarding the intra-procedure pulse oximeter or blood pressure readings. The patient was found to have suffered brain damage and ultimately died from the same.

At trial, the court charged the jury on both ordinary negligence, over objection by the defense, and professional negligence.  The plaintiff argued that the ordinary negligence charge was warranted due to the obvious obligation to save someone if they are not breathing and the misrepresentations made by the defendant doctor to the other healthcare providers.  The court provided no guidance as to which facts and circumstances in the case may apply to which theory of negligence. Further, the plaintiff appears to have argued in closing that the ordinary negligence standard was to be applicable generally to the defendants.

The Georgia Supreme Court made it clear that even “a very strong case of medical malpractice does not become a case of ordinary negligence simply due to the egregiousness of the medical malpractice.”  It was recognized that medical providers could be held to the ordinary negligence standard under the right circumstances, but primarily only in those cases where there was no need to exercise medical judgment.  Multiple times in the Court’s reversing opinion, it was highlighted that the facts of the case involved medical data provided by medical equipment during a medical procedure and the proper response to the same.  It was found that this required the exercise of medical judgment.

In cases involving claims of medical malpractice, the defendant is provided a presumption of due care which must be overcome by expert testimony by the plaintiff.  In cases involving ordinary negligence, no such presumption is given.  The Court found that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that a lay person would not need expert testimony to understand the meaning of the data provided from the medical machines and the proper method of response during the medical procedure.  The “trust” of the plaintiff’s argument was that the defendant doctor failed to properly respond to the data that was being provided by the machines.  This was information that required expert judgment and decision making which was outside the scope of ordinary negligence.

The Court determined that providing the jury with an ordinary negligence instruction, without clarification as to which facts and claims it may apply, invited them to decide the medical liability outside the boundaries for claims of professional negligence.  Primarily the need for expert testimony to overcome the presumption of due care.  This was compounded by the plaintiff’s counsel’s arguments in closing which made no distinction and appeared to encourage the ordinary negligence standard to all claims.  The jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff was a general form and did not allow the Court to determine whether the verdict was based on the application of the appropriate standard.  Because it was error to provide the ordinary negligence charge without further clarification or instruction, the Court reversed and remanded the matter to the Court of Appeals with a direction to send it back to the trial court for a full retrial as to the appealing parties, including the issue of punitive damages to which the plaintiff had previously been awarded $0.

So what does this opinion tell us?  It tells us that ordinary and professional negligence claims can live in the same case, but it is essential that they be clearly defined for the jury.  The trial court’s vague instruction, coupled with the plaintiff’s counsel’s closing argument, invited the reversal in this instance.  As the Court indicated many times, medical data from medical machines during a medical procedure require the exercise of expert medical judgment in determining the proper response.  The failure of the trial court and attorney to set this apart from any ordinary duty of care in defendant’s communications to other medical providers was harmful error which required the retrial.

If you have any questions or would like more information, please contact Shaun Daugherty at [email protected].

Has Fiduciary Rule Suffered a Fatal Blow?

Posted on: April 4th, 2018

By: Theodore C. Peters

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) defined a “fiduciary” as someone who provides investment advice for a fee.  The following year, the U.S. Department of Labor (“DOL”) promulgated regulations that provided a five-part test for assessing whether someone was a fiduciary as defined by ERISA.  Seeking to implement a uniform fiduciary rule for all retail investment accounts, the DOL issued the Fiduciary Rule on April 6, 2016.  The Fiduciary Rule re-defined who is an “investment advice fiduciary” under ERISA and heightened the fiduciary duty to a “best interest” standard for those clients with ERISA plans and IRAs.  Previously, brokers were bound only to make “suitable” recommendations.  The Fiduciary Rule also created a “Best Interest Contract Exemption” that permitted financial advisors to avoid penalties stemming from prohibited transactions so long as they contractually affirmed their fiduciary status.

Several industry groups brought suit against the DOL, opposing implementation of the Fiduciary Rule.  In 2017, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, in an 81-page ruling, ruled in favor of the DOL.  Chief Judge Barbara M.G. Lynn concluded that the DOL had not exceeded its authority and had not created a private right of action for clients. On March 15, 2018, in Chamber of Commerce v. United States Department of Labor, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit invalidated the Fiduciary Rule in a 2-1 decision.

In reversing the lower court, the Court addressed a simple but critical issue: whether the DOL exceeded its rulemaking authority by expanding the definition of “investment advice fiduciary.” The Court concluded that the new definition was in conflict with ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code because it was inconsistent with the common meaning of “fiduciary.”  The Court noted that the DOL arbitrarily and improperly sought to broaden the scope of its authority through the concept of investment “advice,” that included products sold by financial salespersons and even insurance agents. Further, the Court criticized the best interest contract exemption, which permitted brokers to receive compensation for investment products they recommend (thereby creating potential conflicts), provided they agree by contract to act in the investor’s “best interests.”

By vacating the Fiduciary Rule under the Administrative Procedures Act, the Fifth Circuit effectively voided the entire rule nationwide.  The DOL could possibly request a hearing en banc before the entire Fifth Circuit, or alternatively, petition for a writ of certiorari to the United State Supreme Court.  Or perhaps, the DOL will take no action at all, in which case the Fiduciary Rule will presumably die on the vine, and the five-step test enunciated in 1975 would be resurrected. Of note, however, mere days before the Fifth Circuit’s decision, the Tenth Circuit ruled in favor of the DOL in the context of a more limited challenge to the Fiduciary Rule highlighting a split between federal circuits – which may in turn spur the DOL to seek Supreme Court review.

Regardless of what action the DOL takes, the Securities Exchange Commission (“SEC”) is likely to seek to implement its own rules.  Commencing in October 2017, the SEC began reviewing the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule with a goal of introducing its own new rule governing investment advice.   SEC Chairman Jay Clayton testified before the Senate Banking Committee that the drafting of an SEC rule that harmonizes with the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule was a priority.  Despite the Fifth Circuit ruling, the SEC’s resolve appears to remain steadfast.  During a Q&A session at the SIFMA compliance conference just days after the ruling, Jay Clayton said “I’m not sitting on this… [and] as far as I’m concerned, we’re moving forward.”

If you have questions or would like more information, please contact Ted Peters at [email protected].

Supreme Court on Prolonged Detention and Bond for Immigrants

Posted on: March 27th, 2018

By: Layli Eskandari Deal

Immigration has been a hot topic in the news lately due to the various issues being litigated in the Courts.  Recently the Supreme Court made a ruling on the issue of prolonged detention by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) of immigrants who are in removal (deportation) proceedings.

In Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S.Ct. 830 (2018), the Supreme Court held that the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) authorizes the prolonged detention of certain noncitizens without a custody hearing during their removal cases.  This was a reversal of the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals decision that authorized detention only for six months, at which point, the detained individual must then receive a custody (bond) hearing before an Immigration Judge.  Post decision, the Supreme Court has remanded this case back to the Ninth Circuit for consideration of whether the 5th Amendment Due Process Clause entitles immigrants to a hearing over their prolonged detention.

This week the Supreme Court has agreed to review whether U.S. immigration laws allow ICE to indefinitely detain foreign nationals in the removal process if the person has previously committed crimes.  The case is Nielsen v. Preap.  Current laws allow ICE to take an individual into custody after they have served their criminal jail term prior to their release from prison.  A person detained immediately can then be held indefinitely.  The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that foreign nationals who are not promptly taken into custody must be given an opportunity to be released on bond.  The federal government argues the same rules should apply to individuals promptly taken into custody as those who are released from prison and then taken into custody at a later date.  We now await the Supreme Court’s decision on this type of detention.

For additional information related to this topic and for advice regarding how to navigate U.S. immigration laws you may contact Layli Eskandari Deal of the law firm of Freeman Mathis & Gary, LLP at (770-551-2700) or [email protected].