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Appellate Practice: The right-for-any-reason rule

12/9/25

By: Jacob Daly

As a general rule, the scope of appellate review is limited to issues that were raised by the parties and ruled on by the trial court. As a result, appellate courts often refuse to rule on issues that are raised for the first time on appeal. However, they are not prohibited from ruling on such issues. Under the right-for-any-reason rule, appellate courts have discretion to affirm a trial court’s ruling for any reason that appears in the record, even if the parties did not raise it and the trial court did not base its ruling on it.

The right-for-any-reason rule has been a part of federal law almost since the founding. Chief Justice John Marshall wrote in Williams v. Norris, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 117, 120 (1827), that “[i]f the judgment should be correct, although the reasoning, by which the mind of the Judge was conducted to it, should be deemed unsound, that judgment would certainly be affirmed in the superior Court.” Somewhat more recently, the U.S. Supreme Court observed in U.S. v. American Railway Express Co., 265 U.S. 425, 435 (1924), that “the appellee may, without taking a cross-appeal, urge in support of a decree any matter appearing in the record, although his argument may involve an attack upon the reasoning of the lower court or an insistence upon matter overlooked or ignored by it.”

Many states have recognized the rule since the mid-1800s. For example, the California Supreme Court explained, “No rule of decision is better or more firmly established by authority, nor one resting upon a sounder basis of reason and propriety, than that a ruling or decision, itself correct in law, will not be disturbed on appeal merely because given for a wrong reason. If right upon any theory of the law applicable to the case, it must be sustained regardless of the considerations which may have moved the trial court to its conclusion.” Davey v. Southern Pac. Co., 48 P. 117, 117 (Cal. 1897). In Georgia, the rule has been recognized for more than 150 years. In L.J. Glenn & Son v. Shearer, 44 Ga. 16, 16 (1871), the Georgia Supreme Court held, “There will be no reversal of a judgment, if it was right, upon any ground apparent from the record.”

Despite the age of the rule in Georgia, there are still arguments to be made about its applicability in certain situations. On November 3, 2025, the Georgia Court of Appeals issued a split decision regarding the applicability of the rule when the alternative ground for affirmance was not raised by the parties in the trial court. In Gaddy v. Sherard, 2025 WL 3071575 (Ga. Ct. App. Nov. 3, 2025), the dispute between the two-judge majority and the one-judge dissent focused on whether the appellate courts have discretion to affirm a trial court’s ruling based on a reason the parties did not raise in the trial court. The dissenting judge argued that the rule should not apply when the parties did not raise the alternative ground for affirmance in the trial court, but the two majority judges found that the rule is not so limited. Thus, the appellate courts in Georgia have the discretion to affirm the trial court’s ruling on an alternative ground.

Although appellees in Georgia may argue a basis for affirmance that was not raised in the trial court, they should be cautious about relying on such an argument. Indeed, the fact that the appellate courts have the discretion to affirm a trial court’s ruling based on an alternative ground does not mean they will exercise that discretion. For example, in Oskouei v. Orthopaedic & Spine Surgery of Atlanta, LLC, 340 Ga. App. 67, 70 (2017), the Georgia Court of Appeals declined to consider two arguments asserted by the appellees because they did not raise those arguments in the trial court. But, in other cases the appellate courts in Georgia have affirmed a trial court’s ruling on the basis of an argument that the appellee did not assert in the trial court. See, e.g., Brock v. Atlanta Airlines Terminal Corp., 359 Ga. App. 226, 229-30 (2021).

A survey of the case law may identify circumstances when the appellate courts in Georgia are more likely to affirm on an alternative ground, but the lesson from Gaddy is that there is no guarantee one way or the other. An appellate court is more likely to do so when (1) the alternative ground involves an issue of law, (2) the issue of law is not novel or complex, (3) the facts relating to the alternative ground were fully developed in the trial court, and (4) the parties argued the alternative ground in the trial court. Jeffrey M. Anderson, Right for Any Reason, 44 Cardozo L. Rev. 1015, 1049 (2023). The more of these circumstances that are present, the more likely the appellate court is to at least consider the alternative ground for affirmance. In Gaddy, for example, the Georgia Court of Appeals chose to exercise its discretion to affirm based on the right-for-any-reason rule because “the alternative ground for affirmance [was] straightforward and clearly established by the relatively short record on appeal.”

The right-for-any-reason rule is an advantage for appellees because it allows them to defend the trial court’s ruling with arguments the trial court did not rule on. Because preserving the alternative ground by arguing it in the trial court is probably the most important factor in an appellate court’s determination about whether to apply the rule, counsel for the appellee should be involved before the appeal to assist with framing the arguments for the motion that is eventually appealed. Convincing an appellate court to consider an unpreserved argument is difficult, but as Gaddy shows, it is not impossible. After all, considering an unpreserved argument promotes judicial economy by potentially avoiding unnecessary remands, retrials, and multiple appeals. At the same time, however, preservation is a fundamental principle of appellate review. Thus, balancing these competing principles is the challenge facing appellate courts and attorneys when applying the right-for-any-reason rule.

For more information, please contact Jacob Daly at jacob.daly@fmglaw.com or your local FMG attorney.

Information conveyed herein should not be construed as legal advice or represent any specific or binding policy or procedure of any organization. Information provided is for educational purposes only. These materials are written in a general format and not intended to be advice applicable to any specific circumstance. Legal opinions may vary when based on subtle factual distinctions. All rights reserved. No part of this presentation may be reproduced, published or posted without the written permission of Freeman Mathis & Gary, LLP.