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Supreme Court rules geofence warrants are Fourth Amendment searches

7/16/26

By: Jacob Berlinger and Josette Brooksbank

On June 29, 2026, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Chatrie v. United States, holding in a 6-3 decision that law enforcement conducts a Fourth Amendment “search” when it obtains an individual’s cell phone geolocation data through a geofence warrant. This decision expands constitutional protections for digital location data, and carries significant implications for businesses that collect, maintain, or disclose consumer location data.

Underlying issue

This case arose from the 2019 robbery of a credit union in Midlothian, Virginia. In an effort to identify the perpetrator, investigators obtained a geofence warrant directing Google to produce location-history data for devices located within a 150-meter radius of the credit union during the relevant time period.

The warrant authorized a three-step process that gradually narrowed the pool of potential suspects. Google initially produced anonymized location data for every device within the geofence. Investigators then requested additional anonymized information for a smaller subset of devices before ultimately obtaining identifying account information for a limited group of users. Through this process, investigators identified Okello Chatrie as one of three individuals whose devices appeared near the credit union around the time of the robbery. After additional investigative efforts corroborated the location data, Chatrie was subsequently charged.

What is a geofence warrant?

Unlike a traditional search warrant, which targets a known suspect or specific property, a geofence warrant begins with location. Investigators establish a virtual geographic boundary around the scene of a crime and compel a technology provider to disclose location data for all devices present within that area during a specified period. Investigators then analyze the resulting data to identify devices—and ultimately individuals—whose movements may be connected to the offense. Because the warrant begins with a location rather than a suspect, it is often referred to as a “reverse warrant.”

The Court’s decision

Writing for the majority, Justice Elena Kagan concluded that “[a]n individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in records about his cell phone’s location” and that law enforcement conducts a Fourth Amendment search when it compels disclosure of those records from a third-party technology company. Applying the framework established in Katz v. United States, the Court held that individuals maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy in their historical location information despite the data being maintained by a third-party.

In reaching its decision, the Court emphasized the extraordinary breadth and precision of modern location data. Location History can pinpoint a device within approximately twenty meters of its actual location, record its movements at roughly two-minute intervals, and even estimate elevation, potentially identifying the specific floor of a building where a user is located. Collectively, this information provides what the Court described as a detailed chronicle of a person’s movements and associations.

The Court rejected the government’s reliance on the third-party doctrine. It reasoned that individuals do not voluntarily expose their private location information to the government simply by carrying and using a cell phone in modern society. Because the generation of location data is an unavoidable byproduct of everyday technology use, the Court concluded that users do not forfeit their reasonable expectation of privacy merely because that information is maintained by a technology provider.

Finally, the Court made clear that Fourth Amendment protection does not depend on the duration of the surveillance. The constitutional inquiry turns on the nature of the privacy interest invaded, not the amount of information obtained, because the Fourth Amendment applies regardless of “the quality or quantity of information” the government acquires.

The Court’s decision does not prohibit the use of geofence warrants. Rather, by holding that obtaining historical cell phone location data through a geofence warrant constitutes a Fourth Amendment search, the Court made clear that such warrants must satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s traditional requirements. Thus, geofence warrants must be supported by probable cause and describe with particularity the place to be searched and the information to be seized.

Because the geofence warrant at issue involved a three-step process that progressively narrowed the pool of potential suspects, the Court did not decide whether the warrant itself satisfied those constitutional requirements. Instead, it remanded the case to the Fourth Circuit to determine whether each stage of the warrant process complied with the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause and particularity requirements. Going forward, the decision signals that courts will subject geofence warrants and similar requests for digital location data to heightened constitutional scrutiny before permitting law enforcement to obtain such information.

Business implications

Although Chatrie specifically addressed cell-phone location data obtained through geofence warrants, its reasoning may extend beyond geolocation information. By recognizing that sensitive digital information maintained by third-party technology providers may remain protected under the Fourth Amendment, the decision provides a potential framework for future challenges involving government demands for other categories of electronically generated data, including app-generated financial information, digital payment records, health-related data, and similar consumer information.

For businesses that collect or maintain consumer data, this decision is perhaps most consequential not for its privacy rhetoric, but for the litigation and compliance burdens it may create. By recognizing geofence warrants as Fourth Amendment searches, the Court has invited increased scrutiny of investigative practices involving geolocation data and may spur additional suppression motions, constitutional challenges, and § 1983 claims against law enforcement agencies alleged to have relied on defective warrant procedures. The decision increases the importance of clear data-retention policies, disclosure protocols, and procedures for responding to legal processes among businesses that handle user data. As courts continue to define the limits of Chatrie, businesses that possess sensitive consumer data should anticipate increased judicial attention to how that information is collected, stored, and ultimately disclosed in response to government requests.

For more information on this topic, please contact Jacob Berlinger or Josette Brooksbank.

Information conveyed herein should not be construed as legal advice or represent any specific or binding policy or procedure of any organization. Information provided is for educational purposes only. These materials are written in a general format and not intended to be advice applicable to any specific circumstance. Legal opinions may vary when based on subtle factual distinctions. All rights reserved. No part of this presentation may be reproduced, published or posted without the written permission of Freeman Mathis & Gary, LLP.