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Georgia Supreme Court clarifies sovereign immunity for injunctive relief in stormwater runoff cases 

9/5/24

By: R. Cameron Kline and Kevin R. Stone

The Georgia Supreme Court recently took the opportunity to clarify the scope of sovereign immunity for Georgia counties in stormwater runoff cases when injunctive relief is sought. In Satcher, et al. v. Columbia County S24G0336 & S24G0340, the Georgia Supreme Court held that the trial court’s grant of a permanent injunction against the County “from maintaining a defective stormwater drainage system that causes damage to Plaintiffs’ property” exceeded the bounds of the limited waiver of sovereign immunity permitted by the Just Compensation Provision of the Georgia Constitution.  

The Supreme Court explained that previously in Dep’t of Transportation v. Mixon, 312 Ga. 548 (2021), it was established that the Just Compensation Provision of the Georgia Constitution, “waives sovereign immunity for claims seeking injunctive relief in two circumstances: (1) where Just Compensation Provision’s requirement of prepayment before a taking or damaging applies and has not been met; and (2) where the authority taking or damaging has not invoked the power of imminent domain, but only until the authority fulfills its legal obligations that are conditions precedent to eminent domain.” The Supreme Court then further cited to Mixon and explained that, “[t]his waiver under the Just Compensation Provision … allows an injunction only to stop the taking or damaging until such time as the authority fulfills its legal obligations that are conditions precedent to eminent domain.” Id. The Supreme Court elaborated that, in this context, the County could fulfill its legal obligations by either the prepayment of just and adequate compensation or the exercise of eminent domain under a statute which waives the general requirement of prepayment.  

In Satcher, the Supreme Court reasoned that the trial court’s permanent injunction went beyond the scope of the limited waiver of sovereign immunity provided by the Just Compensation Provision. Specifically, the Supreme Court concluded that the permanency of the trial court’s injunction in Satcher went beyond the time that the County could make adequate prepayment of compensation or otherwise exercise the power of eminent domain as established in Mixon. Thus, the Supreme Court held that this injunction exceeded the waiver of sovereign immunity provided by the Georgia Constitution.  

However, without addressing the merits of the County’s argument, the Supreme Court cautioned that sovereign immunity did not bar injunctive relief altogether in Satcher. Ultimately, the Supreme Court directed the Court of Appeals to remand the case back to the trial court with instructions to consider the issuance of a new injunction which does not exceed the waiver of sovereign immunity provided for in the Georgia Constitution.  

For more information, please contact R. Cameron Kline at cameron.kline@fmglaw.com, Kevin R. Stone at kevin.stone@fmglaw.com, or your local FMG attorney.