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Rule 60(b)(4): Not a Get-Out-of-Time-Free card. Supreme Court closes the door on “void anytime” motions.

1/28/26

By: Robert Scavone Jr.

In Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc. v. Burton (Chapter 7 Trustee for Vista-Pro Automotive, LLC), the Supreme Court addressed whether Rule 60(c)(1)’s “reasonable time” requirement applies to a motion seeking to set aside an allegedly void judgment under Rule 60(b)(4). The dispute arose out of a bankruptcy proceeding in which Vista-Pro sought to collect about $50,000 from Coney Island, purportedly failed to comply with the bankruptcy rule governing service by mail, obtained a default judgment in 2015, and then spent years trying to enforce it. Those efforts “bore fruit” when, in 2021, funds were seized from Coney Island’s bank account. Coney Island to move under Rule 60 to vacate the judgment as “void” for lack of proper service.

The Court (9-0) held that Rule 60(c)(1)’s reasonable-time limit applies to Rule 60(b)(4) voidness motions. The Justices looked to the text and structure: Rule 60(c)(1) says a “motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time,” and a Rule 60(b)(4) motion is plainly a motion “under Rule 60(b).” The structure reinforces that reading because the Rule expressly carves out a one-year deadline for certain 60(b) grounds (mistake/new evidence/fraud) but contains no carveout creating an “unlimited time” exception for voidness.

The Court rejected the argument (endorsed by some lower courts) that a void judgment is a “legal nullity” and therefore can be attacked at any time. Even if time cannot “cure” voidness, the Court reasoned, our legal system routinely imposes deadlines for correcting serious legal errors. To create a forever-open door, Coney Island would need to identify some controlling principle—like due process—that requires perpetual availability of voidness challenges, and it did not.

The Court also emphasized the destabilizing consequences of an “any time” rule, such as allowing litigants to “ignore deadlines for filing notices of appeal or petitions for certiorari whenever subject-matter jurisdiction is contested.” And it explained that improper service concerns are handled by the flexible “reasonable time” standard (e.g., it may be reasonable not to move until enforcement efforts put the defendant on notice), rather than by eliminating time limits altogether.

This decision makes timeliness a front-line issue even for “void judgment” attacks; if you suspect defective service or jurisdiction, build a record of when your client learned (or reasonably should have learned) of the judgment and move promptly once notice exists, because “void” will not excuse delay. Conversely, if you’re defending a default judgment, develop the timeline showing early notice (demand letters, enforcement steps, communications) to argue the Rule 60(b)(4) motion was not brought within a reasonable time.

For more information, please contact Robert Scavone Jr.at robert.scavone@fmglaw.com or your local FMG attorney.

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