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Time-limitation provisions in residential lease agreements in Georgia

8/7/24

By: Jacob E. Daly

In 2019, the Georgia Supreme Court was asked to determine the validity of a provision in a residential lease agreement that limited the time during which the tenant of an apartment complex could sue the owner or manager. The provision at issue read: 

Limitation on Actions. To the extent allowed by law, Resident also agrees and understands that any legal action against Management or Owner must be instituted within one year of the date any claim or cause of action arises and that any action filed after one year from such date shall be time barred as a matter of law. 

In Langley v. MP Spring Lake, LLC, the Georgia Supreme Court held that this provision applies only to claims arising from the lease agreement and the landlord-tenant relationship it created, not to “the conceivable universe of legal claims that may arise between the parties.” 

Rather than interpreting the phrase “any legal action” literally to include any legal action, the Court found that this phrase is ambiguous and that, therefore, it had to be construed against the owner and the manager to apply only to claims arising from the lease agreement. The claim at issue in Langley was based on O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 because the tenant sustained injuries when she tripped and fell while walking in a common area of the apartment complex. The Court characterized this as a “free-standing tort claim” because it did not arise from the landlord-tenant relationship memorialized in the lease agreement. The Court noted that the result would have been different if the time-limitation provision in the lease agreement had specifically included tort claims. 

On July 16, 2024, the Georgia Court of Appeals issued its decision in Sneed v. Place at Midway, LLC, which involved the same time-limitation provision at issue in Langley. The tenant in Sneed sustained injuries on two different occasions. The first was when she fell on a gravel walkway that was for her exclusive use. The second was when the ceiling fan in her bedroom fell and hit her on the head. Although the time-limitation provisions in Langley and Sneed were identical, the key difference between the cases was that the injuries in Langley occurred in a common area, whereas the injuries in Sneed occurred in areas that were under the exclusive possession and control of the tenant. 

The time-limitation provision in Sneed did not specifically include tort claims, as Langley suggested would be required, but the Court of Appeals nevertheless found that the provision applied to the tenant’s claims because of where the incidents happened. Unlike incidents that occur in a common area, which are governed by O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1, incidents that occur in an area under the exclusive possession and control of the tenant are governed by O.C.G.A. § 44-7-14, which applies only when there is a landlord-tenant relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant. 

The tenant in Langley had a landlord-tenant relationship with the owner of the apartment complex, but she also had an invitee-owner/occupier relationship with the owner and the management company, and it was this latter relationship that her claim was based on. As a result, her claim was not barred by the time-limitation provision in her lease agreement. In contrast, the tenant’s claims in Sneed were based on her relationship with her landlord, which is why they were barred by the identical time-limitation provision in her lease agreement even though it did not specifically include tort claims. 

The tenant in Sneed filed a petition for a writ of certiorari on August 5, 2024, so the Georgia Supreme Court will have another opportunity to weigh in on this issue should it choose to do so. 

For more information, please contact Jacob Daly at jacob.daly@fmglaw.com or your local FMG attorney.