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Supreme Court clarifies scope of FAAAA preemption for freight brokers

7/14/26

By: Mansour Chopan

On May 14, 2026, the United States Supreme Court issued a unanimous decision in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, holding that a state-law claim alleging a freight broker negligently hired an unsafe motor carrier is not preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act because the claim falls within the statute’s safety exception. The decision resolves a longstanding circuit split and has significant implications for transportation litigation, catastrophic injury claims, broker liability, and carrier-selection practices.

Background

The case arose from a serious trucking accident in Illinois. Petitioner Shawn Montgomery alleged that he sustained severe and permanent injuries after his tractor trailer was struck by a truck driven by Yosniel Varela-Mojena. Varela-Mojena was hauling a load for Caribe Transport II, LLC, a motor carrier. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., a transportation broker, had coordinated the shipment. Montgomery sued multiple defendants and alleged, among other things, that C.H. Robinson negligently selected Caribe Transport despite alleged safety deficiencies.

Montgomery alleged that Caribe Transport had a “conditional” safety rating from the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration and that the agency had identified deficiencies involving driver qualification, hours of service, inspection, repair and maintenance, recordable crash rate, and other safety-related issues. Based on that alleged safety history, Montgomery claimed C.H. Robinson knew or should have known that selecting Caribe Transport to haul the load was reasonably likely to result in crashes and injuries.

The district court held that the FAAAA preempted Montgomery’s negligent hiring claim against C.H. Robinson, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Before the Supreme Court’s ruling, federal appellate courts were divided on this issue. The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits had held that similar negligent hiring claims against brokers were preempted, while the Sixth and Ninth Circuits had allowed such claims to proceed under the FAAAA’s safety exception.

The Supreme Court’s decision

The FAAAA generally preempts state laws “related to a price, route, or service” of a motor carrier or broker “with respect to the transportation of property.” But the statute also contains a safety exception, which provides that the FAAAA does not restrict a state’s “safety regulatory authority” “with respect to motor vehicles.” The Supreme Court assumed, without deciding, that Montgomery’s negligent hiring claim would otherwise fall within the FAAAA’s express preemption provision. The key question was whether the safety exception saved the claim.

Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Barrett concluded that it did. The Court reasoned that state common-law duties and standards of care are part of a state’s authority to regulate safety. Negligent hiring claims impose a duty of reasonable care when selecting a contractor for work that carries a risk of physical harm. The Court then interpreted the phrase “with respect to motor vehicles” according to its ordinary meaning, concluding that a claim falls within the safety exception if it “concerns” or “regards” motor vehicles used in transportation.

Applying that interpretation, the Court held that Montgomery’s claim against C.H. Robinson concerned motor vehicles because it challenged the broker’s selection of the carrier whose trucks would transport the goods. In the Court’s view, requiring a broker to exercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier “concerns” motor vehicles, most obviously the trucks used to move the shipment. The negligent hiring claim therefore fell within the FAAAA’s safety exception and was not preempted.

The Court rejected the argument that this interpretation would swallow the FAAAA’s preemption provision. The Court explained that the safety exception saves only a subset of claims, namely those involving regulation of motor vehicle safety. State laws related to prices, routes, or services that have no relationship to safety remain preempted.

What the decision does not decide

Although Montgomery is significant, its holding is limited. The Supreme Court did not decide that C.H. Robinson was negligent. It did not create a federal standard for broker vetting. It did not identify a specific checklist brokers must follow before selecting a motor carrier. And it did not hold that every trucking accident involving a broker gives rise to broker liability.

Instead, the Court decided only the preemption question. The merits of negligent hiring and negligent selection claims remain governed by applicable state tort law, including duty, breach, causation, foreseeability, comparative fault, and damages. Brokers may still have strong defenses where they selected a reputable carrier, reviewed available safety information, lacked notice of material safety concerns, or where the alleged carrier deficiencies did not proximately cause the accident.

Justice Kavanaugh, joined by Justice Alito, emphasized this point in a concurring opinion. He noted that brokers should be able to defend against state tort claims where they acted reasonably and arranged transportation with reputable carriers. He also recognized that litigation and insurance costs may increase, but concluded that the FAAAA was an economic deregulation statute, not a safety deregulation statute.

Practical impact

The practical effect of Montgomery is that brokers can no longer rely on FAAAA preemption as a categorical defense to negligent hiring or negligent selection claims involving motor vehicle safety. More claims may now survive early dismissal, particularly where a plaintiff alleges that a broker knew or should have known about safety deficiencies tied to the carrier it selected.

This shift will likely affect pleading strategy and motion practice. Plaintiffs will frame broker liability theories around motor vehicle safety, unsafe carrier selection, prior violations, deficient safety ratings, maintenance issues, driver qualification problems, hours-of-service concerns, or accident history. Defense counsel, in turn, will likely focus less on broad federal preemption and more on state-law negligence defenses, including lack of duty, lack of foreseeability, reasonable carrier selection, absence of causation, and intervening conduct by the carrier or driver.

The ruling also has discovery implications. Plaintiffs may seek broker files regarding carrier onboarding, FMCSA safety data, insurance verification, internal risk scoring, prior use of the carrier, safety-rating review, exception handling, and communications concerning why the carrier was selected. For brokers, the ability to show a consistent, documented, and reasonable carrier-selection process may become central to the defense.

For insurers and risk professionals, Montgomery may affect claim valuation, underwriting, contractual risk transfer, indemnity tenders, and defense strategy. Broker liability theories may add another defendant to catastrophic trucking cases and may increase disputes among brokers, motor carriers, shippers, insurers, and additional insureds over defense and indemnity obligations.

Takeaway

Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC is an important development for transportation and catastrophic loss litigation. The decision resolves a federal circuit split and confirms that the FAAAA does not categorically preempt state-law negligent hiring or negligent selection claims against freight brokers when those claims implicate motor vehicle safety.

The ruling does not impose automatic liability on brokers. But it does mean brokers may have to defend these claims on the merits, with attention focused on carrier vetting, safety information, documentation, and causation. For companies involved in freight brokerage, transportation risk management, underwriting, or defense of trucking claims, Montgomery is a timely reminder to evaluate preemption defenses, carrier-selection protocols, contractual risk transfer, and litigation strategy in broker liability matters.

For more information contact Mansour Chopan at mansour.chopan@fmglaw.com.

Information conveyed herein should not be construed as legal advice or represent any specific or binding policy or procedure of any organization. Information provided is for educational purposes only. These materials are written in a general format and not intended to be advice applicable to any specific circumstance. Legal opinions may vary when based on subtle factual distinctions. All rights reserved. No part of this presentation may be reproduced, published or posted without the written permission of Freeman Mathis & Gary, LLP.