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Third Circuit clarifies the scope of disability coverage under the ADA, PHRA

9/12/24

By: Joseph A. McGuire

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals recently issued a precedential opinion “to clarify that the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”) expanded the scope of disability coverage under the” Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). In Morgan v. Allison Crane & Rigging LLC, the Court emphasized that post-ADAAA, the temporary nature of an injury is not dispositive as to whether an impairment qualifies as an actual disability under the ADA. Rather, the Court held, a temporary impairment can be an ADA-qualifying disability if it “substantially limits” an individual’s ability “to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population.” 

Morgan arises from an employee’s assertion that he was terminated because of a workplace injury to his lower back and his resultant temporary light duty restrictions. In the complaint, the employee included claims of disability discrimination, retaliation, and failure to accommodate in violation of the ADA and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”).  

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer. With respect to the employee’s discrimination claim based on lower back pain, the court found that the employee failed to establish that his temporary back pain constituted a disability within the meaning of the ADA. The district court acknowledged that the employee presented evidence that his back pain impaired the major life activities of “bending” and “lifting.” Relying on the Third Circuit’s 2012 decision Macfarlan v. Ivy Hill SNF, LLC, however, the district court nevertheless concluded that the back pain did not qualify as a disability because “a temporary nonchronic impairment of short duration is not a disability covered by the ADA and PHRA.” 

On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed the district court on this issue. The Court began its analysis by noting that the ADA defines an actual disability as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities,” as well as the ADAAA’s mandate that this definition “be construed in favor of broad coverage of individuals” and “to the maximum extent permitted.”  

The Court went on to explain that Congress enacted the ADAAA in response to narrow interpretations of key provisions of the ADA—including, Supreme Court precedent that required an impairment be “permanent or long term” to qualify as a disability. In this regard, the Court stressed that Macfarlan applied the pre-ADAAA standard despite being decided four years after the enactment of the ADAAA because the operative facts in that case occurred prior to the ADAAA’s effective date, and thus, Macfarlan’s exclusion of temporary impairments is inapplicable to post-ADAAA claims.  

Accordingly, the Court held that following the ADAAA, a temporary impairment can qualify as an actual disability under the ADA if it “substantially limits” an individual’s ability to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population.” Turning to the merits of the appeal, the Court found that the record supported such limitations.  

The Morgan decision aligns with the Third Circuit’s previous unpublished opinions with respect to the impact of the ADAAA and with the growing number of Courts of Appeals that have addressed the issue in a published opinion, including the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits.  

The Court’s decision is also consistent with the EEOC’s position on ADA-qualifying impairments. Notably, the central holding of the opinion—that an impairment, even if temporary, can qualify as a disability if it substantially limits an individual’s ability “to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population”—is a verbatim quote of an EEOC regulation. 

Perhaps more noteworthy to Pennsylvania employers and practitioners, the Morgan decision also resolves a budding disagreement among its district courts on whether the ADAAA’s expanded scope of disability coverage applies to claims brought under the PHRA, notwithstanding that the PHRA has not been amended since the enactment of the ADAAA. On this point, the Court pronounced: “Absent an act of the Pennsylvania legislature or guidance from Pennsylvania courts that the ADAAA is inconsistent with the PHRA, federal courts should continue to interpret the PHRA in harmony with the ADA.” 

For more information, please contact Joseph A. McGuire at joseph.mcguire@fmglaw.com or your local FMG attorney.