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Georgia Court of Appeals confirms that the municipal ante litem statute still has teeth

6/17/26

By: Jacob Daly

In three decisions issued in the first half of 2026, the Georgia Court of Appeals has confirmed that the municipal ante litem statute still has teeth.  This follows a decision by the Georgia Supreme Court last year relaxing the service requirement for municipal ante litem notices. Fleureme v. City of Atlanta, 322 Ga. 180 (2025). The statute requires the notice to be served on “the mayor or the chairperson of the city council or city commission . . . by delivering the claim to such official personally or by certified mail or statutory overnight delivery.” The Supreme Court held that this requirement is satisfied by a notice that is addressed generically to “Office of the Mayor,” as long as it is sent to the correct address, because such a notice “is calculated to get to an official standing in the shoes of that city.” This holding suggests that it does not matter whether the notice actually gets to the mayor or whether it gets to the mayor after the six-month deadline has passed.

The most recent decision by the Court of Appeals is a follow-up to Fleureme. In Jones v. City of Atlanta, No. A26A0382, 2026 WL 1551551 (Ga. Ct. App. June 2, 2026), the plaintiff addressed her ante litem notice to “Mayor Andre Dickens” at the correct general address for City Hall, but it had the wrong suite number. The Court of Appeals held that Fleureme did not save the plaintiff’s claims because an ante litem notice that is delivered to the correct street address but the wrong suite number “is not calculated to be delivered to the official specified in OCGA § 36-33-5(f).

The other two decisions by the Court of Appeals involved the requirement of stating “the negligence which caused the injury.” In Hicks v. City of Albany, 927 S.E.2d 323 (Ga. Ct. App. 2026), the plaintiff was injured when he stepped on a stormwater drainage intake lid in his yard and the lid dislodged, causing him to fall into the intake system. His ante litem notice noted that the City owned and maintained the lid, but it said nothing about the City’s alleged negligence. The Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff’s notice did not comply with the statute because a notice that fails to allege negligence, and therefore the basis for the plaintiff’s claim, “is not sufficiently definite to enable to municipality to inquire into the alleged injuries and determine whether the claim shall be adjusted without suit.”

The plaintiff in Kiser v. Mayor & Alderman of City of Savannah, No. A26A0658, 2026 WL 1468259 (Ga. Ct. App. May 26, 2026), fared no better. She tripped and fell while walking in a crosswalk across a street, and her ante litem notice stated only that “the City, through its agents and employees, were negligent in causing the fall.” The Court of Appeals held that this statement did not was insufficient because “[s]imply alleging the City was negligent does not provide sufficient definiteness to satisfy the requirements of OCGA § 36-33-5(b) requiring a plaintiff state the negligence that caused the injury, especially when there are many possible ways a city’s negligence could cause or contribute to a fall in a crosswalk.” The Court of Appeals also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that her notice was sufficient because the City actually was able to investigate her claim: “The fact that the City conducted a preliminary investigation of her claim in response to her written ante litem notice and denied liability does not remedy [her] failure to comply with the requirements of the ante litem notice statute.”

These three decisions are important for two reasons. First, Jones shows that Fleureme did not completely eviscerate the service requirement. Plaintiffs have some leeway under Fleureme, but Jones make clear that a notice must be calculated to be delivered to the proper person for it to be valid. Second, Hicks and Kiser show that the negligence requirement cannot be satisfied by implied or assumed negligence based on the fact that the city owns or is responsible for maintaining the property where the injury occurred.

For more information on this topic, please contact Jacob Daly at jacob.daly@fmglaw.com.

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