BlogLine

Georgia Court of Appeals holds only material terms required to form a settlement agreement are those within statute

2/11/26

Business people, hands and pointing on contract for legal documents, application and agreement in office. Pen, closeup and person explain paperwork for policy, form or deal in workplace or company

By: Meredith Freidheim

A recent opinion from the Georgia Court of Appeals enforced a settlement agreement under the 2024 version of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-67.1.

The underlying facts of this case arise out of a motor vehicle accident involving Abriel Torres, the claimant, and Fredy Pineda, who was insured under a liability policy with State Farm. Torres sent Pineda a letter under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-67.1 offering to settle her claims for the $25,000 policy limit in exchange for a limited liability release. As a part of the offer, Torres required that State Farm provide “an oral statement by the assigned claims representative before a court reporter authorized to administer oaths regarding whether all liability and casualty insurance coverage provided by State Farm to Pineda ha[d] been disclosed.” Torres argued this term of the offer complied with O.C.G.A. § 9-11-67.1(b)(1)(G). However, nothing in the language of the statute required State Farm to provide this statement orally in front of a court reporter.

As a result, State Farm responded by accepting the material terms of the offer and indicated it would provide the statement under oath as required under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-67.1(b)(1)(G). After State Farm sent a written statement under oath instead of an oral one, Torres’s counsel returned the check and contended that the parties never reached a binding settlement agreement. Specifically, Torres’ counsel stated State Farm did not comply with a material term of the offer when it failed to provide an oral statement under oath in front of a court reported.

When Torres filed suit, Pineda moved to enforce the settlement agreement by arguing that State Farm timely accepted the material terms of Torres’ offer that were allowed under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-67.1. Agreeing with Pineda, the Court explained Torres could not require any additional or more restrictive terms without State Farm’s consent. In doing so, the Court emphasized that the only material terms required to form a settlement agreement are those listed in O.C.G.A. § 9-11-67.1. The Court therefore concluded that a binding contract existed when State Farm accepted the material terms of Torres’ offer that were permitted under the statute.

For more information on this topic, please contact Meredith Freidheim at meredith.freidheim@fmglaw.com or your local FMG attorney.

Information conveyed herein should not be construed as legal advice or represent any specific or binding policy or procedure of any organization. Information provided is for educational purposes only. These materials are written in a general format and not intended to be advice applicable to any specific circumstance. Legal opinions may vary when based on subtle factual distinctions. All rights reserved. No part of this presentation may be reproduced, published or posted without the written permission of Freeman Mathis & Gary, LLP.