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By: Mike Flint and Laura Broome
In 2005, the tort reform passed by the Georgia legislature included a statute that changed the standard for suing emergency room health care professionals in medical malpractice actions. The statute in essence states that no health care provider who provided emergency medical care in a hospital emergency department, or surgery suite, etc., after the patient has been treated in the emergency room, shall be held liable for an action in medical malpractice unless it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the physician or health care provider’s actions showed gross negligence. The standard for liability of emergency medical care personnel was changed thereby from ordinary negligence by a preponderance of the evidence to gross negligence by clear and convincing evidence.
Case law further defines the new gross negligence proven by clear and convincing evidence standard as “that degree of care which every man of common sense, however inattentive he may be, exercises under the same or similar circumstances.” In other words, gross negligence has been defined as “equivalent to [the] failure to exercise even a slight degree of care.” “Clear and convincing evidence” is “a more stringent standard than ‘preponderating’ and requires a greater quantum and a high quality of proof in plaintiff’s favor.” As a result of this higher standard, there has been far fewer malpractice lawsuits filed against emergency room professionals.
Despite these hurdles, a recent trial suggests that a jury may be allowed to determine whether emergency medical care was provided in the emergency room, thereby triggering the higher standard in the first place. In the recent case, the plaintiff was presented to an emergency room with severe leg pain, but was sent home with a diagnosis of a skin rash, despite not being able to walk. The plaintiff later returned to the emergency room by ambulance after she was found unresponsive, and was determined to have severe blockage in her leg arteries. The plaintiff’s legs were both amputated below the knees a few days later.
Plaintiff’s counsel argued that the lower standard of ordinary negligence under a preponderance of the evidence standard should apply because the legal definition of emergency medical care does not include non-urgent patients in stable condition. Plaintiff’s counsel claimed that this plaintiff was considered to be a non-urgent patient in stable condition during her first trip to the emergency room.
The judge allowed the jury to decide whether the plaintiff received emergency medical care, and thus whether the gross negligence standard or ordinary negligence standard applied. The jury determined that the care the plaintiff received in the emergency room during the initial visit was not emergency medical care, and thus applied the ordinary negligence standard in the case. In doing so, the jury further decided the emergency room defendants were negligent in failing to diagnose the plaintiff’s blocked arteries during the initial emergency room visit, and awarded $5 million to the plaintiff in damages.
It will certainly be interesting to see if other courts follow this lead in allowing juries to decide which standard applies.