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Posts Tagged ‘supreme court’

Independent Contractor Or Employee?

Posted on: September 20th, 2018

By: Marshall Coyle

The California Supreme Court has established an “ABC test” that could make it extremely difficult for the state’s truckers to use independent contractors. In Dynamex Operations West Inc. v. Charles Lee, (Case S222732, April 30, 2018) the Supreme Court endorsed what is called the three-pronged ABC test legal standard.

In Dynamex the lawsuit involved allegations by drivers that Dynamex, a nationwide package and document delivery company, had misclassified its delivery drivers as independent contractors rather than employees. The high state court affirmed the appeals court ruling that supported the workers, endorsing what is called the three-pronged ABC test legal standard.

To be classified as an independent contractor, the ABC test requires that: (A) the worker is free from the control and direction of the hiring entity in connection with the performance of the work; (B) the worker performs work that is outside the usual course of the hiring entity’s business; and (C) the worker is customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation or business of the same nature as the work performed.

The state Supreme Court said that in recent years federal and state regulatory agencies have declared that the misclassification of workers as independent contractors rather than employees is a serious problem that deprives federal and state governments billions of dollars in tax revenue and millions of workers of labor law protections.

“On the one hand, if a worker should properly be classified as an employee, the hiring business bears the responsibility of paying federal Social Security and payroll taxes, unemployment insurance taxes and state employment taxes, providing worker’s compensation insurance, and, most relevant for the present case, complying with numerous state and federal statutes and regulations governing the wages, hours and working conditions of employees,” the court wrote in its opinion.

“On the other hand, if a worker should properly be classified as an independent contractor, the business does not bear any of those costs or responsibilities, the worker obtains none of the numerous labor law benefits and the public may be required under applicable laws to assume additional financial burdens with respect to such workers and their families.”

If you have any questions or would like more information, please contact Marshall Coyle at [email protected].

Are We Witnessing the End of Qualified Immunity?

Posted on: September 19th, 2018

By: Sun Choy

For many decades, qualified immunity has served as a powerful defense to end civil cases against public officials, including law enforcement officers for the alleged use of excessive force.  Given the many high-profile deaths involving the use of force by officers, progressives have again called for the end of qualified immunity.  Even some conservatives are now calling for an end to qualified immunity.  In a recent National Review article, the author lays out a conservative rationale to end qualified immunity, which is primarily based on the “plain meaning” of the statutory language of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  With progressives and conservatives joining forces, is it only a matter of time before the Supreme Court ends qualified immunity?

If you have any questions or would like more information, please contact Sun Choy at [email protected].

Arbitrability – Who Decides?

Posted on: September 14th, 2018

By: Ted Peters

The question of arbitrability (i.e., Who decides whether a dispute is arbitrable? The court or the arbitrator(s)?) is as ageless as the conundrum of what came first, the chicken or the egg.  In 2010, the Supreme Court decided Rent-a-Center, Vest Inc. v. Jackson, wherein it concluded that agreements to arbitrate questions of arbitrability are, themselves, enforceable.  That dispute involved an employee who had signed an arbitration agreement that provided for arbitration of disputes arising out of his employment, including discrimination claims.  The agreement expressly provided that the arbitrator, and not a court, had the exclusive authority to resolve any disputes relating to the enforceability of the arbitration agreement.  The Ninth Circuit Court determined that the employee’s argument that the agreement was unconscionable was a matter of fact for the court rather than the arbitrator.  In a split vote, the Supreme Court found otherwise, and concluded that because the employee challenged the agreement as a whole (and not only the delegation provision), the determination had to be made by the arbitrator.

The US Supreme Court will weigh in again on the issue of arbitrability. On June 25, 2018, the Court accepted certiorari in the case of Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., a case in which the Fifth Circuit addressed the arbitrability of antitrust claims asserted against a distributor of dental equipment.  The defendants/appellants sought to enforce an arbitration agreement.  The magistrate granted a motion to compel arbitration, concluding that the threshold question of the arbitrability of the claims was vested in the decision of an arbitrator, and not for a court to decide.  The district court, however, reversed, finding that it had the authority to rule on the question of arbitrability and concluded that the claims at issue were not arbitrable.  The Fifth Circuit affirmed finding that submission of the dispute to the arbitrator was not necessary because the assertion of arbitrability was “wholly groundless.”  The appellate court explained that the arbitration clause in question created a carve-out for “actions seeking injunctive relief,” but did not limit the exclusion to “actions seeking only injunctive relief.”  The court reasoned that even though the agreement would allow the plaintiff/respondent to avoid arbitration by simply adding a claim for injunctive relief did not change the clause’s plain meaning.

The decision in Henry Schein underscores that a conflict has developed among the lower courts; some recognizing an exception for “wholly groundless” claims of arbitrability, but others not.  Defendants/appellants seek to have the Supreme Court reject the “wholly groundless” exception, asserting that the Fifth Circuit’s decision cannot be reconciled with the Federal Arbitration Act’s text or its overarching purpose: “to ensure that private agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to their terms.”  The question presented before the Court is simple: “Whether the Federal Arbitration Act permits a court to decline to enforce an agreement delegating questions of arbitrability to an arbitrator if the court concludes the claim of arbitrability is “wholly groundless.”

Oral argument is scheduled for October 29, 2018.

If you have questions or would like more information, please contact Ted Peters at [email protected].

Supreme Court to Revisit Liability Under Rule 10b-5 – Will Prospective Justice Kavanaugh Weigh In?

Posted on: July 25th, 2018

By: Ted Peters

Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, and Rule 10b-5 promulgated under it, makes certain conduct in connection with the purchase or sale of any security unlawful.  Specifically, Rule 10b-5(a) prohibits the use of any “device, scheme, or artifice to defraud.”  10b-5(b) prohibits the use of any “untrue statement of a material fact” or the omission of any “material fact necessary in order to make the statements… not misleading.”  And 10b-5(c) prohibits “any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.”

In Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011), the United States Supreme Court addressed whether a mutual fund investment adviser could be held liable under Rule 10b-5 for false statements included in its client mutual funds’ prospectuses.  The Court concluded that the adviser could not be held liable under the rule because it did not make the statements in the prospectuses.

In Lorenzo v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 872 F.3d 578 (2017), the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeal considered whether a registered representative of a broker-dealer, who allegedly emailed false and misleading statements prepared by his boss to investors, could be found liable under Rule 10b-5.  Initially, the case was tried before an Administrative Law Judge who concluded that Lorenzo’s boss had drafted the emails in question; Lorenzo did not read the text of the emails; and Lorenzo had “sent the emails without even thinking about the contents.”  The judge also found that the emails were sent “at the request” of Lorenzo’s boss.  Notwithstanding these findings, the judge nevertheless concluded that Lorenzo had willfully violated securities laws (i.e., that Lorenzo had acted with an intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud).  As a sanction, the judge not only fined Lorenzo, but also imposed a lifetime suspension effectively barring him from the securities industry.

Lorenzo appealed the ruling before the Securities Exchange Commission.  The Commission affirmed, concluding that Lorenzo himself was “responsible” for the contents of the emails his boss asked him to send even though it was undisputed that Lorenzo’s boss had prepared the contents of the emails and that Lorenzo had simply “cut and pasted” the contents into the emails at issue.  Notably, the SEC found that Lorenzo’s conduct triggered liability under each of the subparts of Rule 10b-5, including 10b-5(b) which, under Janus, necessarily required an affirmative finding that Lorenzo had actually “made” the statements in question.

Lorenzo next appealed to the D.C. Circuit Court.  On September 29, 2017, a divided court upheld the SEC’s determination.  The court agreed that there was substantial evidence that the statements in Lorenzo’s emails were false or misleading and that Lorenzo possessed the requisite intent to mislead, deceive or defraud. However, the court disagreed with the SEC’s determination that Lorenzo was the “maker” of the statements as required by Rule 10b-5(b).  “We conclude that Lorenzo did not ‘make’ the false statements at issue for purposes of Rule 10b-5(b) because Lorenzo’s boss, and not Lorenzo himself, retained ‘ultimate authority’ over the statements.” [Citing Janus.]  On this basis, the court set aside the sanctions and remanded the case to enable the SEC to reassess appropriate penalties.

Judge Brett Kavanaugh, the current presidential nominee to fill the vacancy left by Justice Kennedy, penned a strongly worded dissent.  Kavanaugh criticized the conclusion reached by his colleagues that the “scheme liability” provisions of Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) may be used to find liability even where the defendant is not the “maker” of the statements (and thus not liable under 10b-5(b)).

On June 18, 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court granted the petition for writ of certiorari.  The question before the Supreme Court is simple: Can a defendant be held liable under the so-called scheme liability provisions of Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) in connection with using false or misleading statements, even if that defendant is not the “maker” of the statements?  That the Court accepted certiorari certainly suggests that the Court desires to further define the scope and limitations of Rule 10b-5.

Should Kavanaugh be confirmed as the next Supreme Court Justice, it remains to be seen whether he will recuse himself on the grounds that he heard the case below.  If he does, then the Court could well end up with a 4-4 split, which would effectively affirm the lower court’s ruling.  The Court’s four more liberal justices (Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor and Kagan) each dissented from Janus.  On the other hand, if Kavanaugh is confirmed and does not recuse himself, the majority of the Court will likely endorse a more restrictive interpretation of scheme liability under Rule 10b-5.

If you have questions or would like more information, please contact Ted Peters at [email protected].

On-Premises Rest Breaks: Should I Stay or Should I Go?

Posted on: July 18th, 2018

By: Allison Hyatt

Under California law, non-exempt employees are entitled to a 30-minute meal break if the employee works more than 5 hours in a workday, and a 10-minute break for every 4 hours worked (or “major fraction” thereof).  In the past, employers commonly required employees to remain on the premises during rest breaks.  However, with the California Supreme Court’s decision in Augustus v. ABM Services, Inc. (2016) 2 Cal. 5th 257, which emphasized the fact that employers must “relinquish any control over how employees spend their break time,” employers should discontinue any such policies still in practice.

Although the issue in Augustus was on-call rest periods and therefore the Court did not directly consider an on-premises rest break policy, the California Labor Commissioner’s office updated its fact sheet on rest breaks to specially address on-premises break policies in light of the Augustus opinion.  Quoting the Supreme Court’s opinion, the Labor Commissioner’s office explained that employers cannot impose such restraints, stating: “‘during rest periods employers must relieve employees of all duties and relinquish control over how employees spend their time.’  As a practical matter, however, if an employee is provided a ten minute rest period, the employee can only travel five minutes from a work post before heading back to return in time.”

Moving forward, it is unclear as to how courts will address pre-Augustus on-premises rest break policies believed to be legal at the time.  The Augustus Court did not clarify any limitations to what appears to be a sweeping ruling described by the Dissent in Augustus as a “marked departure from the approach we have taken in prior cases.”  2 Cal. 5th 257, 277.  In one post-Augustus case, Bell v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55442 (E.D. Cal. April 11, 2017), the Eastern District of California declined to reconsider a summary judgment ruling in favor of Home Depot on the plaintiffs’ claims that Home Depot violated California law by requiring employees to remain on premises during rest breaks.  The Eastern District had ruled, prior to the decision in Augustus, that such a policy did not violate the applicable California wage order and statute.  In response to the plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration, Home Depot argued that the Augustus decision implies that restricting employees to the premises, without additional duties or constraints, does not violate the rule.  The Eastern District declined to alter its ruling, noting:

“[t]he facts in Augustus and the present matter are distinct, as the present case does not concern ‘on-call’ rest periods. . . The Augustus court did not directly consider an on-premises rest break policy which does not require employees to remain on call such as the one at issue here.  While the Court finds Defendants’ reading of Augustus more persuasive and accurate than Plaintiffs, it does not specifically adopt Defendant’s interpretation that Augustus affirmatively condones on-premises rest breaks.  Rather, the Court finds that the holding in Augustus does not go as far as Plaintiffs contend.”  2017 U.S. LEXIS 55442 at *5.

It will be interesting to see how other courts interpret the implications of the Augustus opinion.  For now, employers are encouraged to follow the California Labor Commissioner’s advice and discontinue any practices that impose any restraints on how employees spend their break periods.  If you have any questions or would like more information, please contact Allison Hyatt at (916) 472-3302 or email at [email protected].