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Connecticut Supreme Court declines to recognize a common-law cause of action for loss of filial consortium
2/17/25
The Connecticut Supreme Court, in a 4-1 decision, in L.L. et al v. Newell Brands, Inc., et al, 351 Conn. 262 (2025), declined to recognize a common-law cause of action for loss of filial consortium. In the underlying action, the parents of a minor child brought a product liability claim on behalf of the minor child who was injured following a fire. The parents brought their own claim for loss of filial consortium as a result of the injuries suffered by the minor child. The defendants moved to dismiss the loss of filial consortium claim which was denied by the Court without prejudice. The District Court then certified a question of law to the Connecticut Supreme Court asking whether Connecticut recognizes such a cause of action.
In answering the certified question in the negative, the Court took a look at their prior decisions which recognized causes of action for loss of parental consortium and loss of spousal consortium, as well as decisions from other jurisdictions which both allowed and refused to allow loss of filial consortium claims. Here, the Court decided that it would not extend these causes of action to a parent of a child who has suffered severe but nonfatal injuries as a result of the conduct of a third party. The Court’s rationale focused on the fact that a parent does not rely on an infant child for financial support, household assistance, or emotional solace. The Court noted that there are losses of parental consortium and loss of spousal consortium claims because there is an inherent reliance and dependence by both a child and a spouse on their parent or spouse that simply does not exist from parent to child. The parent-to-child relationship does not share the same reciprocity as the other relationships do. As a result, the Court found that the concerns raised in the decisions that allowed the loss of parental consortium and loss of spousal consortium claims did not exist here.
Both the majority opinion and the concurring opinion noted that the pain a parent experiences when their child suffers a severe injury is a type of emotional distress the parent may experience rather than the type of relational loss or loss of society for which a cause of action for loss of consortium affords a remedy. The concurring opinion was careful to note, however, that the Court was not asked to determine whether Connecticut law recognizes some other cause of action under these circumstances. The concurring opinion then went on to state that the distress suffered by the parent was as real and severe as any other noneconomic harm that the law of torts deems compensable. Further, this type of harm would certainly be foreseeable to a party that manufactures or sells a product designed for use by a child. The concurring opinion left the question of whether parents in similar circumstances could obtain compensation by other means, either through a bystander emotional distress claim or a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim. It should be noted that both types of claims have foreseeability of the type of harm experienced as a necessary element of their claims.
The lone dissenting opinion took issue with what was perceived as the Majority’s sidestepping a necessary public policy analysis. The dissenting opinion found fault with the Majority’s weighing of the relational interests between the parent and child rather than conducting a full public policy analysis which the Court did previously when recognizing the loss of parental consortium and loss of spousal consortium claims. The dissenting opinion suggested that the Majority sidestepping the public policy analysis was essentially giving up its inherent authority to the State Legislature to create the cause of action.
For more information, please contact Edward N. Storck III at edward.storck@fmglaw.com or your local FMG attorney.
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