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Most consequential civil decision of 21st Century issued by Illinois Supreme Court on standing

12/15/25

By: Patrick Eckler and Ryne Sack

In a seminal decision, the Illinois Supreme Court held that a plaintiff lacked standing to bring a FACTA violation claim because she did not raise concrete harm in her pleadings. The plaintiff in Fausett v. Walgreen Company pled “speculative future injury” in her FACTA claim, which the Court determined was insufficient to confer standing under Illinois Law. This is one of the most important civil decisions in recent history, as claims like this now lack standing in federal and state court in Illinois, leaving no forum to bring similar actions.

On March 7, 2019, Fausett paid Walgreens to let her add money to a prepaid debit card. Following the transaction, the cashier provided plaintiff with two electronically printed receipts, which disclosed the first six and last four digits of Fausett’s 16-digit debit card number. She filed a class-action complaint against Walgreens, alleging that Walgreens willfully violated FACTA by issuing a receipt with more than the last five digits of the debit card number. To establish harm, Fausett alleged that Walgreens caused her to suffer a heightened risk of identity theft, exposed her private information to others who may have handled the receipt, and forced her to take action to prevent further disclosure of the private information displayed on the receipt.

Under Illinois law, there is common-law standing, which requires an injury in fact to a legally recognized interest, and there is statutory standing, which requires the fulfillment of statutory conditions to sue for legislatively created relief. Common-law requires the injury to be (1) distinct and palpable, (2) fairly traceable to the defendant’s actions, and (3) substantially likely to be prevented or redressed by the grant of the requested relief.

The court distinguished the FCRA from the act in Rosenbach, a case cited by plaintiff. In Rosenbach, the act in question was BIPA, which states that “any person aggrieved by a violation of this Act shall have a right of action in a State circuit court or as a supplemental claim in federal district court against an offending party.” Under BIPA, statutory standing was given to “aggrieved” parties, who are able to bring lawsuits under facts similar to this case. This case is distinguishable because the FCRA has no such language. It is silent on standing, which means the plaintiff must satisfy the three-part common-law standing requirements.

In its argument that Fausett lacked standing, Walgreens cited to Petta v. Christie Business Holdings, a 2025 decision that set forth the above mentioned three-part test and stated that “the injury alleged by the plaintiff must be concrete; a plaintiff alleging only a purely speculative future injury or where there is no immediate danger of sustaining a direct injury lacks a sufficient interest to have standing.”

In this case, the circuit court stated it seemed undisputed plaintiff was a no-injury plaintiff. Ultimately, the Court held that Fausett’s increased risk of harm was a purely speculative future injury, which is insufficient to confer standing. The Court reversed the judgments of both the appellate and circuit courts and remanded to the circuit court to dismiss the cause for lack of standing.

These types of cases are brought all the time in Illinois because Illinois was granting statutory standing under similar circumstances in the past. This decision wipes out the state of Illinois as a forum for these claims unless Congress expressly gives statutory standing to bring a claim of this nature.

For more information, please contact Patrick Eckler at patrick.eckler@fmglaw.com, Ryne Sack at ryne.sack@fmglaw.com or your local FMG attorney.

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