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Second Circuit clarifies Title VII religious accommodation standard

8/6/26

By: Arielle Katz

The Second Circuit recently clarified the legal standard for religious accommodation claims under Title VII. In Bergin v. New York State Unified Court System, the court ruled that an employee’s claim must be evaluated under the framework established by the U.S. Supreme Court in EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. The decision overturned a district court ruling in favor of an employee who challenged the denial of a religious exemption from a COVID-19 vaccination requirement and returned the case to the lower court for further review.

Background

Jessica Bergin, a court officer employed by the New York State Unified Court System (UCS), sought a religious exemption from UCS’s COVID-19 vaccination requirement in 2021. UCS denied her exemption request and later terminated her employment after she failed to comply with the vaccination requirement. After the vaccination policy was rescinded, Bergin returned to work and pursued a Title VII claim alleging that UCS failed to accommodate her religious beliefs.

The district court granted partial summary judgment in Bergin’s favor, finding that she had established a religious accommodation claim under Title VII. UCS appealed.

The Second Circuit’s ruling

On appeal, the central issue was whether the district court applied the correct legal standard to Bergin’s religious accommodation claim under Title VII.

For many years, courts in the Second Circuit required employees to show that they held a sincere religious belief that conflicted with a workplace requirement, informed their employer of that belief, and suffered an adverse employment action for failing to comply with the requirement.

But the Bergin court held that, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., the traditional formulation of a Title VII religious accommodation claim must be reconsidered and analyzed under the Abercrombie framework. Instead, the court explained that a plaintiff must show that she needed a religious accommodation and that the employer’s desire to avoid providing that accommodation was a motivating factor in the adverse employment decision. The decision shifts the focus from what the employer knew about the employee’s religious beliefs to whether the employer’s desire to avoid providing an accommodation motivated the employment decision.

The court further explained that an employer’s knowledge of the need for an accommodation may be evidence of motive, but it is not required to establish a claim. The court did not eliminate an employer’s ability to defend against such claims by showing that accommodating the employee would have imposed an undue hardship under Title VII.

Judicial admissions remain narrowly construed

The Second Circuit also disagreed with the district court’s reliance on certain statements UCS made during the litigation. The district court had pointed to statements that Bergin’s exemption request was “perfectly adequate” and “explained a religious belief” as evidence that UCS effectively acknowledged the validity of her request.

The Second Circuit held that those statements could not be viewed in isolation. According to the court, UCS consistently maintained that it needed additional information to evaluate the sincerity of Bergin’s religious objections. As a result, the court concluded that the statements did not conclusively establish either the sincerity of Bergin’s asserted religious objection or her entitlement to an accommodation.

Because the district court relied heavily on those statements when granting summary judgment, the Second Circuit vacated the decision and remanded for further proceedings.

What employers should know

Although the decision arose from a COVID-19 vaccine exemption dispute, its impact extends beyond that context. The ruling clarifies that courts evaluating religious accommodation claims will focus on whether the employee needed a religious accommodation and whether the employer’s desire to avoid providing that accommodation was a motivating factor in the challenged employment action. Notably, the court rejected the argument that Abercrombie applies only to hiring decisions, holding that the same framework applies to termination decisions because Title VII treats hiring and firing alike.

Although Bergin addresses the elements of a Title VII religious accommodation claim, employers should remember that the Supreme Court’s decision in Groff v. DeJoy continues to govern the standard for assessing whether a requested accommodation would impose an undue hardship.

The decision also serves as a reminder that statements made during litigation should be considered in context. Courts are unlikely to treat isolated statements as conclusive admissions unless they are clear and unequivocal.

Key takeaway for employers

Bergin is an important development for employers facing religious accommodation claims under Title VII. The decision confirms that courts in the Second Circuit will apply the framework articulated by the Supreme Court in Abercrombie when evaluating those claims. Employers reviewing accommodation requests should continue to carefully document the reasons for their decisions and apply accommodation review processes consistently.

For more information on this topic contact Arielle Katz at arielle.katz@fmglaw.com or your local FMG Law attorney.

Information conveyed herein should not be construed as legal advice or represent any specific or binding policy or procedure of any organization. Information provided is for educational purposes only. These materials are written in a general format and not intended to be advice applicable to any specific circumstance. Legal opinions may vary when based on subtle factual distinctions. All rights reserved. No part of this presentation may be reproduced, published or posted without the written permission of Freeman Mathis & Gary, LLP.